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I. INTRODUCTION
The ongoing debate over civil pleading standards is ultimately the
product of two competing asymmetries. An informational asymmetry
favoring defendants over plaintiffs drives a preference for liberal pleading
standards. That is, the typical defendant often has sole possession of
relevant information, and plaintiffs often cannot know critical details of
their claims before discovery.1 Thus, the risk of wrongful dismissals
militates against adoption of a stricter standard. This is a "false negative"
or "Type II" error risk.2
Asymmetry in pretrial costs favoring plaintiffs over defendants instead
supports stricter pleading standards in some circumstances.3 Several
traditional characteristics of U.S. civil litigation-the adversary system,
relative judicial disengagement, the "American Rule" governing attorneys
fees, and prevailing summary judgment standards-combine in a small but
significant subset of cases to increase defendants' expected pretrial costs
relative to plaintiffs'. Plaintiffs may therefore file and defendants may
sometimes settle substantively frivolous claims, simply to avoid the even
greater cost of defending the claims to disposition. This risk of cost
arbitrage militates against the adoption of more liberal standards. This is a
false positive or Type I error risk.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Thanks to Larry Solum,
Tom Ulen, Charles Tabb, and the law faculties of the University of Illinois and the University of
Indiana-Indianapolis, and participants in the 2007 Big Ten Untenured Conference for their
valuable comments on previous versions of this Article. Thanks also to John Leubsdorf, Michael
Solimine, and Max Huffman for their helpful comments.
'See, e.g., Christopher Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEXAs L. REv. 551, 552, 561-62,
565, 625 (2002).
2
,"Type I error" and "Type II error" are terms commonly used in the social sciences literature.
Formally, a Type I error is an error in which the null hypothesis is rejected when in fact it is true;
Type II error occurs whenever the null hypothesis is not rejected when in fact it is false. JAMES H.
STOCK & MARK W. WATSON, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS 79 (2d ed. 2007). For purposes
of this Article, the null hypothesis is that a particular U.S. civil case has substantive merit. Here a
Type I error occurs when a case resolves in plaintiffs' favor despite the fact that it was objectively
frivolous. A Type II error occurs when a case is dismissed but was objectively meritorious.
3 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES,
MOTIONS TO DISMISS ANTITRUST CASES: SEPARATING FACT FROM FANTASY 3-5, 12, 20-21
(Mar. 2006).
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Because both asymmetries often exist as to a single claim type,4
pleading standards present an apparently insoluble problem. A stricter
pleading standard might reduce the rate at which opportunistic plaintiffs file
frivolous claims, but it might simultaneously reject claims that would have
proved valid had they been allowed to progress through discovery. Overly
liberal pleading standards present the opposite concern.
Further complicating matters, modern U.S. pleading standards are
generally transsubstantive; with few exceptions, 5 U.S. courts apply the same
pleading standard regardless of the type of claim or the error risks that
claim presents.6 If transsubstantivity is a nonnegotiable prerequisite,7 any
wholesale modification of the pleading standard must not reduce net social
welfare as a side effect. If transsubstantivity is negotiable, any new
prescriptive framework must reduce error risk without adding undue
complexity and expense to an already expensive system. Given the
apparently inevitable circularity of the error debate and the practical
challenges presented by the transsubstantivity norm, the pleading problem
appears intractable at first blush.
The economics of pleading are critical to finding a solution.8 U.S. civil
litigation is in many ways an inherently economic enterprise, 9 and pleading
is a critical nexus in that enterprise-a "point of no return" beyond which
the parties are bound to expend substantial sums in the development of their
claims and defenses. Because little can be done to alter the parties'
incentives after the pleading stage, it is important to understand the
economic effects of pleading rules on potential litigants' decisions and the
Type I and Type II risks they engender.
4The incidence of both risks is likely to be highly correlated. See infra discussion at Part
V.D.
5See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring heightened pleading in claims alleging fraud or
mistake); see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2) (requiring that the plaintiff "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind").
6 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
7But see Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 987, 1028
(2003) [hereinafter Fairman, Notice Pleading] (arguing that the actual landscape of pleading
standards is fractured).
8 This is true even if one does not accept economic theories of procedural justice. See infra
notes 139-152 and accompanying text.
9 See generally ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(2003).
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This Article analyzes the economics of the civil litigation process with
an eye toward solving the pleading problem. Part II describes critical
features of U.S. civil litigation. Specifically, it focuses on (1) adversarial
interaction between parties with limited government enforcement and
limited judicial oversight, (2) liberal discovery standards, (3) the American
Rule under which parties typically pay their own costs of suit regardless of
outcome, and (4) prevailing summary judgment standards under Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett.10 Taken together, these characteristics can create an
environment conducive to economic gamesmanship. These characteristics
also suggest that adjusting the pleading standard may be the best available
mechanism for curtailing that gamesmanship.
Part III briefly examines the history of U.S. pleading; concluding that
notice pleading is often superior to other possible forms of case initiation.
Compared to its historical predecessors, notice pleading helps solve three
potentially pernicious problems: (1) informational asymmetry favoring
defendants in many cases, (2) potential agency issues between plaintiffs and
their attorneys, and (3) disparity between the likely quality of plaintiff's
representation relative to the defendant's.
Part IV offers a simplified plain-language economic model of the
pretrial process." Holding other features of the U.S. civil litigation system
constant, this model identifies the economic circumstances under which
cost arbitrage by plaintiffs is likely. The model predicts that defendants
will be indifferent between settlement and litigation to conclusion when the
full economic costs of each decision are equivalent. Because defendants
cannot avoid most pretrial costs once the plaintiff has successfully cleared
the pleading gate, plaintiffs thus will file even objectively frivolous lawsuits
when they can impose higher net pretrial costs upon defendants than
defendants can impose upon plaintiffs.
But the model and the available data together suggest that many
common types of litigation do not actually raise substantial risk of cost
arbitrage because rough parity in pretrial costs (or disparity favoring
defendants rather than plaintiffs) will limit plaintiffs' incentives to file
without genuine expectation of a merits recovery in excess of their costs.
The model conversely predicts that frivolous filing is likely in the subset of
case types where (1) the plaintiff can impose substantial pretrial costs on
10477 U.S. 317 (1986).
"The Appendix provides a more formal economic model corresponding to the plain-
language summary presented in Part IV.
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defendant, (2) the defendant cannot impose substantial reciprocal pretrial
costs on plaintiff, and (3) the defendant will not incur substantial external
costs through early settlement.
After briefly addressing theories of procedural justice and the state of
the existing pleading literature, Part V proposes a partial solution to the
asymmetry conundrum. Rejecting a rigidly transsubstantive approach, 12
this part ultimately recommends bifurcating pleading standards along cost
disparity lines. For the great majority of cases, liberal notice pleading will
be appropriate; there is a low risk of cost arbitrage, and thus, liberal
pleading rules are justified on information asymmetry grounds. But in the
small subset of claims in which a defendant may be a victim of cost
arbitrage, the Article recommends a stricter default standard that would:
(1) lower the risk of Type I error, (2) lower the internal costs of litigation by
focusing and filtering discovery, and (3) lower the administrative costs of
lawsuits by reducing both the number and likely duration of certain suits.
The Article recommends mitigating any concomitant increase in Type II
wrongful dismissal risk through adoption of an "opt-out" pleading
procedure in which plaintiffs could obtain the right to proceed under
relaxed notice pleading standards by paying a bond designed to reduce cost
arbitrage incentives.
II. SALIENT FEATURES OF U.S. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
The U.S. civil litigation system has a number of unique and important
characteristics that must factor into any attempt to model pleading
standards.1 3 In combination, these characteristics fix U.S. civil litigation as
a game in which interim economic calculations can be as important as the
ultimate substantive merits of any particular claim. Taken together, these
characteristics also suggest that the pleading standard may be the only
genuine "moving part" subject to adjustment without a massive and thus
unlikely reordering of the entire U.S. litigation system. Thus, these features
of U.S. civil litigation have enormous implications for the proper design of
the pleading standard.
12But see Fairman, Notice Pleading, supra note 7, at 1037-38 (discussing the difference
between the unitary transsubstantive ideal and fractured reality).
13 For simplicity's sake, this Article is based exclusively on the federal system; all rules-based
descriptions come from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. With respect to the features
highlighted in this Article, most U.S. jurisdictions employ functionally identical mechanisms and
standards. The model is thus essentially generally applicable within most U.S. jurisdictions.
2009]
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A. Judicial Indifference and the Adversary System
One of the most striking features of the U.S. civil litigation landscape is
the relative lack of judicial involvement between the filing of a claim and
determination of the case on the merits. 14  U.S. civil litigation depends
enormously upon competition between private parties-rather than judicial
micromanagement or government enforcement-to guarantee just
outcomes. 15
Compared to most other legal systems, U.S. civil enforcement relies
heavily upon private attorneys general to secure compliance with the
substantive law. 16  A vast number of statutes, both state and federal,
explicitly contemplate private enforcement concurrent with or even in place
of government enforcement; the Supreme Court has found implied private
rights of action in many others. 17  Though private enforcement is an
important cog in the civil justice wheel, private parties' incentives do not
always align with government interests. Instead, private parties generally
act in their perceived self-interest during litigation. Given that, one might
anticipate a judiciary actively dedicated to reigning in private parties'
litigation excesses.
This is not the case. Under the Federal Rules it is possible for a judge to
have no face-to-face interaction with the parties until she is presiding over a
trial or ruling on dispositive summary judgment motions. 18  The Rules
permit, but do not require that judges take an active role in case
14 Compare the U.S. system to the European inquisitional model, in which a disinterested
judge actively manages most of the inquiry. See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL: THE
PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 119-34 (1980).
15 Alexia Garamfalvi, U.S. Firms Prepare for European Class Actions, LEGAL TIMES, June
25, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/llf/PubArticleLLFjsp?id=1 182762353567.
"
6 There is some indication that Europe is on the cusp of a private litigation revolution. In
April 2008, the European Commission's (EC) competition authority issued a white paper
suggesting the need for private enforcement of the EC's antitrust laws. COMM'N OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHITE PAPER ON DAMAGES ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF THE EC
ANTITRUST RULES 3 (2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files-white-paper/whitepaper-en.
pdf; see also id. (discussing projected increase in European class action litigation).
"715 U.S.C. § 15(a) (authorizing private antitrust suits); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 (1971) (finding implied right of action for
securities fraud).
18See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) (stating the court may order pretrial conferences); id. 16(b)
(stating court scheduling orders may be issued after consultations in person, by mail, or by other
means); id. 16(c) (stating the court may hold final pretrial conference).
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management, and judges and litigants have economic and social incentives
to minimize judicial participation.1 9 As a result, courts tend to involve
themselves only infrequently in the day-to-day administration of cases.
Courts admittedly have substantial power to control cases. Federal
Rules 11, 16, 26, and 37, among others, give courts the basic authority to
manage litigation. But courts do not exercise this power often. In fact, that
power sometimes is at most a Sword of Damocles hanging over the
litigating parties' heads, with the mere threat of judicial intervention
generating incentives for the parties to avoid interaction with the court in
the first place. In the typical case, judges are reluctant to inject themselves
into the proceedings, and the parties are reluctant to seek judicial
involvement.2 °
Because they work for a fixed salary with effective lifetime tenure,
federal judges face an incentive to minimize their overall workload.2'
Elected and other limited-term judges may face some countervailing
pressure, but their overall incentives are similar. Judges cannot typically
control the number of cases assigned to them, of course, nor can they
ultimately exercise more than limited control over the effort they must put
forth at case's end. But judges can and do limit their efforts in between
filing and disposition. The simplest and most common means by which
judges reduce their workload is by insisting that the parties resolve their
own pretrial disputes, especially those relating to discovery. Judges often
are able to create and sustain a credible threat of retribution toward
litigants-a threat that in turn limits the number of discovery disputes over
which the judge must preside.23
19See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?(The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1,2,4-7,12,20-22, 31 (1993).
20 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636-37, 639 (1989).
2 1 The dynamics of U.S. legal culture and its expectations regarding the judiciary suggest that
even elected judges with relatively short terms will not be penalized substantially for attempts to
limit their intra-case workloads. See Posner, supra note 19, at 4-5, 7 (noting in a slightly different
context that there is little "output" on which the public can judge appellate performance).
22 Courts may attempt to limit even end-of-case workload, most frequently by denying
summary judgment motions without opinion, in the hope that the denial will drive settlement. But
the prospect of having to preside over a trial and other norms and incentives may limit the extent
to which courts attempt this strategy. Id. at 20-22.
23Calls for increased judicial supervision without structural changes that improve judicial
incentives to do so are likely to be unsuccessful. See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 639. For
every judicial Boxer, there is likely to be at least one Old Benjamin, Mollie, or cat. See GEORGE
ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 46-47 (Signet Classics 1996) (1946).
2009]
BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
Litigants themselves are understandably reluctant to invoke the court's
power as to interim matters and especially as to discovery disputes. In
addition to the risk of formal judicial retribution, litigants understand that
disturbing the court also costs money and can lead to tit-for-tat exchanges
that enrich only the lawyers. The cycle of tit-for-tat interaction thus
increases both the defendant's and the plaintiffs overall expenditures. A
party, therefore, will tend to seek the judge's help only when the benefits
are likely to exceed the costs.
24
Thus, simple cases often resolve after few or even no direct face-to-face
interactions between the court and the litigants. And even complex
litigation is subject to a norm against judicial micromanagement For
cases in which the parties do seek judicial intervention, the calculus is
explicitly economic and is built in the shadow of a noninterventionist norm.
Liberal discovery rules 26 and rational, inescapable judicial ignorance
also can limit substantially the courts' ability to intervene between filing
and trial; even when a party might want to seek judicial help, there is often
little or no legal basis for intervention. Rule 26 authorizes discovery
"regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or
defense of any party .... ,27 And "relevance" is itself defined liberally to
include all material "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. 28  Thus, in many circumstances, even a judge
inclined to intervene on behalf of a party may have little ability to do so.
The broader and less defined the plaintiffs claim (i.e., the less specific
her pleadings), the less able the judge will be to limit or focus pretrial
inquiry. This is partially because the judge's hands may be tied by the
discovery standard. But it is partially because judges do not, and cannot,
educate themselves completely regarding the issues facing them early in
litigation. Unlike the parties, the judge's knowledge of most cases is
limited to the pleadings and the briefing submitted for her review. She
cannot (and indeed ethically should not) educate herself further, nor is it
24 This can occur either or both by changing the net expected value of the claim at final
disposition, or less commonly, by shifting the pretrial cost expectations of the parties. But seeking
judicial intervention involves risks of its own. For simplicity's value, this Article models litigation
without judicial intervention.
25 See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 640.
26 See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Most states employ a substantively identical discovery standard.
28 1d"
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rational for her to do so in light of her other workload, limited judicial
resources, and the high rate at which civil cases settle.
Thus, a judge confronted by broad pleadings without obvious plausible
factual anchors to which discovery can be tethered may not be able to limit
cost disparity-both because of the breadth of prevailing discovery
standards and because she is necessarily ignorant of the details of the
dispute.29
In such cases, absent meaningful and obvious pleading filters, judges
may be unable to limit in any significant way the breadth or depth of
plaintiff s discovery until it reaches some aggregate critical mass justifying
summary judgment evaluation. Thus, in addition to the independent
challenges presented by liberal discovery rules,3 ° the discovery standard
itself can hamstring judicial efforts to minimize the social costs of
litigation.
The adversary system also understandably magnifies the impact of
systemic distrust between the parties. Since courts typically prefer not to
interfere in disputes until the summary judgment stage or later, the parties
are left with a vexing agency problem: each party is expected to act as the
other's agent when it comes to searching for and producing relevant
information. Thus, the party obligated to provide much of the information
necessary to litigation has substantial incentives to not provide that
information. Ethics rules, social constraints, and the risk of sanctions
(however remote) do constrain these incentives to a limited extent.
However, adversaries nonetheless face incentives (and their attorneys
arguably have a legal obligation) to parse their opponents' discovery
requests restrictively. It is virtually always in the requesting party's interest
to counteract that incentive by casting as wide a net as possible.
Adversarial incentives create a sort of feedback loop as well. Courts are
aware of the parties' incentives and are therefore understandably reluctant
to circumscribe discovery, especially in certain categorical ways, because
they are understandably concerned that the parties are behaving
strategically in asking for specific limitations on discovery. Is the
defendant asking that searches of his email archives be limited because the
29Courts' inability to manage pretrial effectively in some cases suggests that exhortations to
greater judicial effort may ultimately be unavailing. See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 638-39.
3 0See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
3 1See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 641 ("Lawyers practicing in good faith, therefore,
engage in extensive discovery; anything less is foolish.").
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social cost-benefit calculus for the search is genuinely skewed or because
he suspects that his email archives contain information harmful to his
defense?
B. Liberal Discovery
According to one recent study, discovery consumes approximately 50%
of all federal litigation expenditures; moreover, that study noted that
discovery can account for "as much as 90% of the litigation costs in the
cases where discovery is actively employed. 32  Since trial is itself an
expensive proposition, discovery costs are likely an even greater percentage
of typical pretrial costs. Viewed ex ante, expected discovery costs
overwhelmingly dominate the parties' assessments of their pretrial costs-
liberal discovery comes at a steep price.
U.S. discovery is so costly in large part because the scope of permissible
inquiry is remarkably broad. A standard making discoverable "any matter,
not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense" allows inquiry into a
stunning range of topics, and the definition of "relevant"-anything that
"appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence" 33-tends to expand rather than circumscribe the universe of
discoverable material. Nor are the forms of permissible discovery
inherently self-limiting. In addition to traditional pretrial simulacra of trial
cross-examination-interrogatories,34  depositions,35  requests for
admission 36 -U.S. discovery rules also explicitly allow the parties to seek
discovery of "documents, electronically stored information, and tangible
things. 37  In other words, U.S. civil discovery rules require litigating
32 Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon.
Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D.
340, 357. Though the memorandum does not directly define "actively employed," it does note
that in almost forty percent of federal cases, no discovery occurs, and that "in an additional
substantial percentage of cases, only about three hours of discovery occurs." Id. Presumably the
remainder of the cases involve "actively employed" discovery.
33 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
34 See id. 33.
3 5See id. 30-31.
3 6See id. 36.
371d. 34.
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parties to search for and produce to their opponents all nonprivileged
discoverable materials from their files.
38
In document-intensive cases, this requirement is often enormously
expensive. The producing party must first search for responsive
documents, frequently no easy task in itself. In typical complex litigation,
the producing party might identify and then interview or search every
individual and institution likely to have relevant information, erring toward
over inclusion to avoid any allegation that the search has been unreasonably
narrow. Next, the producing party must put the documents into some sort
of reviewable form-either electronic or hard copy-often at incredible
expense. Then the producing party must review all materials collected,
both for "responsiveness"-whether the document is relevant and fairly
responds to the opposing party's request-and for attorney-client or other
forms of privilege.39 In practice, this can mean thousands of person-hours
spent reviewing thousands or even millions of documents. Finally, the
producing party produces the documents for inspection and prepares a
"privilege log" detailing the documents withheld under a claim of
privilege.40
Because the failure to withhold privileged information can in some
circumstances result in the waiver of a privilege, and because the producing
party has an overwhelming interest in identifying damaging or helpful
documents and limiting production where ethically possible, it is typically
incumbent upon producing parties to review every page of every document
for both privileged content, and for its potential impact on the case. Thus, a
request for production under ordinary circumstances puts into motion a
series of extraordinarily expensive events that the producing party can
bypass only at its extreme peril.
In the aggregate, discovery costs can sometimes run to the millions of
dollars or more for a single party in a single complex case. 41 Thus, in
38Id. 26(b)(1). Subject to relatively recent limitations on discovery of electronically stored
information that would be too expensive to produce. See id. 26(b)(2).
39 See Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Nw J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171,
181-82 (2006).
4 0See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(5).
41 For a real-world primer on the costs of complex case discovery and judges' limited ability
to manage those costs, see generally Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, No. 3:07-cv-01658-PJH (N.D. Cal.
July 3, 2008), available at
http://www.tnlawsuit.com/uploads/Order/20Re%2OScope%20oP/o20Discovery%20of/o2OElectr
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certain situations, concerns about discovery costs can overwhelm concerns
about the merits of the underlying claim; a defendant facing $3 million in
discovery costs will not be much heartened by his belief that victory is
ultimately inevitable. If discovery costs cannot be limited or avoided
altogether, then the promise of certain eventual success on the merits may
be hollow indeed.42
Taken together with characteristic judicial disengagement from pretrial
procedure, the liberal discovery framework is remarkable. It contemplates
that the parties will develop the facts necessary to their claims or defenses
with minimal influence or interference from the court. The default
assumption is that the parties will conduct the entire discovery process-no
matter how expensive-with limited or no judicial supervision, subject only
to certain Rule-imposed limits. Thus, with potentially enormous cost, and
with little realistic prospect of judicial management, liberal discovery rules
can create economic incentives largely independent of the merits of any
particular claim.
C. The American Rule
1. The General Standard
In the vast majority of U.S. litigated cases, each party bears its own
litigation costs, including attorney's fees, regardless of who prevails. This
arrangement has come to be known as the "American Rule," in contrast to
the "English Rule" or "Continental Rule" under which the losing party
pays.43 Though several substantive U.S. regulatory regimes provide for
onically%20Stored%201nformation.pdf (Order Regarding Scope of Discovery Of Electronically
Stored Information).
42See infra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing how cost disparity can effectively
deny defendants' participation rights).
43Virtually every other western legal system employs some form of the English Rule.
Adoption of the English Rule as a solution to cost arbitrage is beyond the scope of this Article, but
it should be noted that the evidence and theory on that solution are decidedly mixed. See
generally Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really
Cheaper?, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 143 (1987); see also Jiong Gong & R. Preston McAfee, Pretrial
Negotiation, Litigation, and Procedural Rules, 38 ECON. INQUIRY 218, 218 (2000); see also
Roger Bowles, Settlement Range and Cost Allocation Rules: A Comment on Avery Katz's
Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
177 (1987). Moreover, English Rule fee shifting is rarely complete in practice. See TULLOCK,
supra note 14, at 110-11.
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one-sided "loser pays" fee-shifting 44 such situations are the exception rather
than the rule.45
In American Rule contexts, parties must operate on the assumption that
they will bear their own costs, regardless of the outcome. As important,
under most circumstances, a party knows that its opponents will bear
whatever costs the party can impose on it, regardless of the merits of the
underlying claim. The implications are obvious: in most litigated cases, the
parties' expected pretrial payoffs are driven in large part by their expected
internal litigation costs. In the absence of "loser pays" fee-shifting, success
(or failure) on the merits becomes irrelevant to the parties pretrial
expectations.
2. Courts' Authority to Cost-Shift
a. Post-Resolution Cost-Shifting
In theory, at least, courts have the authority under Rule 1 1 to deviate
from the American Rule if they detennine that a plaintiffs initial pleading
was frivolous. 46  But this authority is rarely exercised,47 and defendants
faced with strike suit risk cannot generally rely upon Rule 11 sanctions to
make them whole. 48 Rule 11 requires plaintiffs to certify that they have a
good faith factual basis for their claims 49 or that they "will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation
or discovery. 50 If a court ultimately finds that the plaintiffs' contentions
44See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (authorizing fee award for successful plaintiff; Congress
did not authorize a corresponding fee award for successful defendants).
45See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(ii) (requiring party seeking attorney's fees to specify "the
statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the movant to the award").
41 See id. 11 (c).
47 Gerald F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court: An Empirical, Comparative
Study, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 313, 326-27 (1992) (noting that sanctions are rarely sought or imposed
in state courts).
48See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Insuring Rule 11 Sanctions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 344, 344 (1989)
(noting estimates of 600 to 1000 nationwide Rule 11 decisions in the past six years, or between
100 and 167 annually, with awards "as high as $200,000 to $300,000"). While arguably
impressive in the abstract, these figures (and especially the relatively low amounts for high-end
monetary sanctions) are unlikely to prove a sufficient deterrent to plaintiffs seeking cost arbitrage
in complex cases.
49See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(1).
5
°/d. 1l(b)(3).
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were unreasonable, it "may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney,
law firm, or party that violated the rule., 51 Read broadly, these provisions
would seem to provide courts with the ability to correct opportunistic
frivolous pleading; though the sanction is to be "limited to what suffices to
deter repetition of the conduct," it can include "all of the reasonable
attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation. 5 2
Rule 11 even seems to contemplate systemic deterrence, authorizing
sanctions sufficient to deter "comparable conduct by others similarly
situated. 53
But there are several problems with relying on Rule 11. First and
foremost, it just doesn't work. Reported cases involving Rule 11 sanctions
of any type are surprisingly rare and reported cases in which the sanction
for frivolous pleading includes the defendant's discovery costs are virtually
nonexistent. There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon.
At one end of the spectrum, it may be that there are no frivolous filings, and
thus there is no need for such sanctions. Perhaps, but as discussed below,
there exists in certain limited circumstances a strong economic incentive for
cost arbitrage-an incentive arising out of the defendant's corresponding
incentive to settle rather than litigate.54 It is possible that attorney's fees
sanctions are rare because misbehavior is rare. But the absence of reported
cases just as likely reflects defendants' collective discounting of any "post-
dismissal sanctions payoff." The more steeply the payoff is discounted, the
more likely settlement becomes.
Defendants may discount their expected back-end sanctions payoffs for
at least three reasons. First, hindsight is 20/20. That is, defendants may
rationally discount expected sanctions payouts because they perceive a low
probability that a court will authorize sanctions in an amount sufficient to
offset pretrial costs. Assuming a pleading satisfies the pleading standard
(begging a question we will take up in Part V), it may be difficult for a
court to look backward to the plaintiffs filing with the clarity necessary to
impose meaningful sanctions that will actually deter future misbehavior by
others similarly situated. Somewhat ironically, hindsight may get blurrier
as pretrial costs increase because, having acquiesced to expensive injury on
"lId. 11l(c)(1).
521d. I 1(c)(4).
53 id.
54See Tobias Holdings, Inc. v. Bank United Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 162, 166 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
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the front end, courts will be understandably reluctant to impose
economically meaningful sanctions.
Defendants may also discount their expected back end sanctions payoffs
because they do not believe the plaintiff/or her attorney will have the ability
to pay. Plaintiffs generally have fewer resources than defendants, and even
a well-financed plaintiffs attorney may not be able to make defendant
whole. In the Supreme Court's recent Twombly opinion, 55 for example, the
defendants' estimated discovery costs were in the tens of millions of dollars
while plaintiffs' costs were likely an order of magnitude (or more) lower.
Few plaintiffs' attorneys could satisfy a $10 million post-dismissal
sanction.
Finally, there is some prospect of a "deterrence disconnect"-that is, the
court may decide that a given sanction is sufficient "to defer repetition of
the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated" without in
fact making defendant whole. 6 In economic terms, this reasoning is
inherently fallacious: deterrence is economically insufficient until the
expected value of the defendants' sanctions payout fully offsets cost
disproportionately, which means it must also account for the risk of
nonpayment. 7  But it would nonetheless be tempting for courts to
undersanction.
5 8
In any event, to the extent the defendant discounts the likelihood of
being made whole through imposition of postjudgment sanctions, those
sanctions no longer provide a meaningful disincentive to settlement. The
economically rational defendant who expects, for example, even a
nominally large $500,000 fee sanction in "compensation" for a $3 million
disparity in pretrial costs may not pursue the matter to disposition,59
although the settlement amount will decrease by the expected value of the
55 See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 n.6 (2007).
56 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (c)(4).
57 Thus, the solution offered in Part V relies in part on precommitment of the optimal sanction
amount as precondition to pursuing high risk claims under a notice pleading standard.
5 An economically effective sanction would have to fully account for the disparity in pretrial
costs, discounted for likelihood of imposition and likelihood of collection. If a $1,000,000
payment would be necessary to render the defendant indifferent between settlement and litigation
of a frivolous claim, but the defendant regards the likelihood of imposition at twenty-five percent
and the likelihood of payment at twenty-five percent, the expected sanction amount would need to
be much higher than $1,000,000.00 to achieve indifference.
59 See infra Part IV.
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sanctions amount. 60 And the rational plaintiff will not be deterred by that
nominally large expected sanction, because she knows the defendant will
never get that far. Moreover, even taking Rule 1 1 at face value, a plaintiff
ostensibly could file any claim consistent with Rule 8(a)(2), conduct
discovery, and then withdraw the claim before a sanctions motion was
filed.6 1 A court is unlikely to entertain a sanctions motion before adequate
time for discovery has passed, so the risk of Rule 11 sanctions would not
seem to offer much deterrence value.
b. Interim Cost-Shifting
For similar reasons, the courts' ability to shift costs while the case is
ongoing may be more apparent than real. Courts theoretically have the
power to shift pretrial costs on an ongoing basis under a variety of Rules
provisions. 62  But the deterrent value of intra-case cost-shifting again
depends upon the defendant's ex ante assessment of his likely payoffs.
Thus, the same sorts of concerns-judicial myopia, plaintiff insolvency,
suboptimal judicial economic analysis-may lead the defendant to discount
the value of that solution. More important, the court's apparent authority to
cost shift is triggered only in the event of either specific circumstances
involving electronically stored information or if a party violates a pretrial
order.63 The Federal Rules do not appear to contemplate or to authorize
intra-case cost shifting as a matter of general equity.
The prospect of intra-case fee-shifting may also create incentives for
additional strategic behavior on the part of litigants. If the responding party
regards cost shifting as likely ex ante, it may face an incentive to maximize
its own costs, especially if there are significant differences in the marginal
6 0Here and elsewhere, the term "expected value" refers to the probability of a given event
multiplied by the magnitude of that event. For events denominated in dollars, the expected value
of the event is the expected payoff multiplied by the probability of that payoff. See, e.g., DAVID
BESANKO & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMIcs 571-72 (3d ed. 2007). Thus, the
expected value of a million-dollar lottery that one has a ten percent chance of winning is
$100,000. If a defendant believes that the Rule 11 sanction for plaintiffs spurious filing will be
$100,000 and that he has a twenty-five percent chance of obtaining that sanction from the court
after dismissal of the claim, the expected value of the sanction is $25,000, and defendant may
rationally discount his strike settlement value by that amount.
61 Rule I I's structure also militates against its potential effectiveness. Rule 1 1(c)(2) allows
parties time to withdraw frivolous claims before a motion for sanctions can be filed.
62See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f); id. 26(b)(4)(C); id. 37 (a)(5)(A).
63See id. 26(b)(4)(C); id. 16(f)(2).
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value of money to the two parties. Similarly, there is no obvious and
coherent way to shift the bulk of privilege and responsiveness review costs
from one party to another-though it may be possible to cost shift as to
electronic searching or database creation, it W:ii bc ;ctio,,,, impossible
for courts to cost shift as to the producing party's own review. Between
gaming concerns and endless arguments over what is a "legitimate" review
cost, courts likely would be unwilling to allow a defendant to finance a
"Cadillac" document review partially at the plaintiffs expense, and would
be ill-suited to determine what a "Chevy" review would look like.64 Even
in English Rule jurisdictions, fee shifting is rarely complete, and there is
little reason to believe it could work in the United States.65
The American Rule reality-that parties generally must anticipate
bearing their own litigation costs for most claims-dramatically affects the
parties' pretrial analyses of their claims and defenses. The primary effect of
the American Rule is to elevate cost parity to an importance it would not
enjoy under the English Rule or under a mandatory intra-case fee-shifting
regime. Because the parties will pay their own way regardless of the
outcome they face incentives and have some ability to maximize their
opponents' costs and minimize their own.
D. Summary Judgment Standards
The final relevant component of U.S. pretrial procedure is the prevailing
summary judgment standard. Under Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, judges may
grant summary judgment to the moving party when the non-moving party
has failed "after adequate time for discovery" to produce summary
judgment evidence in support of an essential element of the non-moving
party's claim or defense.66 Consider a negligence case requiring proof of
negligence, causation, and damages. If after adequate time for discovery a
plaintiff has produced no evidence that the defendant's negligent act caused
plaintiff's injuries, summary judgment in favor of the defendant would be
appropriate even if the plaintiff had produced evidence of both defendant's
negligence and of the plaintiff s injuries themselves.
64See supra notes 14-44 and accompanying text.
65 See TULLOCK, supra note 14, at 110-11.
66477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). There are literally thousands of lower court cases fleshing out
the full contours of post-Celotex summary judgment procedure, but the root of modem no-
evidence summary judgment procedure is Celotex itself.
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Celotex reaffirms the uniquely American commitment to substantial
party-driven pretrial discovery. By so doing, it leaves the door open to the
possibility of opportunistic pleading by plaintiffs.
Most of the economic impact of the Celotex standard lies in the phrase
"after adequate time for discovery." A defendant faced with even the most
ridiculous imaginable substantive claim-assuming it is properly pleaded-
cannot typically move for summary judgment until there has been
"adequate time for discovery." So, if for example the defendant knows with
certainty that he is not liable for plaintiff's injuries because he was never
involved in an accident with plaintiff, he cannot generally move for
summary judgment or dismissal until after the plaintiff has had adequate
time to conduct discovery. And "adequate time" usually means "adequate
discovery," which in turn means that defendants cannot escape even
completely frivolous suits until after they have expended substantial sums
of money responding to plaintiff's discovery requests.
In the hypothetical introduced above, of course, cost imposition would
likely be minimal-a defendant denying the fact of an accident pled with
typical specificity may well be able to convince a court to limit discovery to
that fact, and the plaintiffs costs of bringing such a claim would likely
equal or exceed defendant's. 67 In addition, in cases of that sort, the prospect
of sanctions may well prove a legitimate deterrent.
But consider instead a complex claim alleging the existence of a years-
long conspiracy that defendant ultimately can prove never occurred. Under
Celotex, the plaintiff has a right to substantial discovery; she is in effect
entitled to search the haystack for needles. Assuming plaintiffs complaint
passes the pleading bar, the defendant's next opportunity to dispose of the
case will come only after "adequate time for discovery" has passed as to an
essential element of the plaintiffs claim. Depending upon the nature of the
claim and the nature of the pleading standard, "adequate time for discovery"
may imply thousands or even millions of dollars of unavoidable expense for
the defendant, regardless of the merits of plaintiffs underlying claim.
These expenses will necessarily increase in the absence of sequential filters
that provide a court with the means to manage discovery under Rule 16.68
67See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
68See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii).
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E. Summary
U.S. civil litigation is a world in which certain litigants may find it
tempting to engage in strategic behavior unrelated to the merits of their
claims or defenses. The front-loading of litigation expenses and the laissez
faire approach of the judiciary create particular risk. Because the pleading
standard serves as the gatekeeper to the heart of the U.S. pretrial system, it
is worth exploring the current approach to pleading under federal law.
III. NOTICE PLEADING
A. What is Pleading?
For the purposes of this Article "pleading" refers exclusively to the
initial written filing submitted to a court by plaintiff to initiate a civil case.
As discussed above the salient features of post-pleading U.S. pretrial
procedure tend to make the pleading stage critically important; once the
plaintiffs complaint passes muster under Rule 8, the train has effectively
left the station. The "pleading standard" therefore is the set of threshold
requirements a plaintiff s case-initiating written filing must satisfy to obtain
access to discovery and the other case development tools and procedures
characteristic of U.S. litigation.
B. A Brief History of U.S. Pleading
There have been three major periods in the history of U.S. civil
pleading. The common law writ era, imported from England, lasted from
the Founding through roughly the middle of the nineteenth century. During
this period, pleading followed traditional English common law practice:
parties shoehorned legal claims into one of a series of preexisting writs and
responses, sequentially narrowing the issues subject to trial. 69 Common law
writ pleading was a highly specialized and technical exercise, and selection
of the wrong writ at the wrong time could doom an objectively meritorious
claim to dismissal without a hearing on the merits.7°
69 See William H. Lloyd, Pleading, 71 U. PA. L. REv. 26, 26-36 (1922) (providing summary
of common law pleading practice).
70 See id. at 33 (By the early nineteenth century, "the complaints against the prolixity,
obscurity and triviality of common law pleading became louder; the demand for reform more and
more insistent").
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Beginning in the late 1840s with New York's adoption of the Field
Code, U.S. procedure began a gradual move away from common law
pleading toward "code pleading" or "fact pleading." 7 Designed to be
simpler and more just than common law pleading was believed to be, fact
pleading required that the plaintiff plead facts in support of each of the
elements of her claim. That is, fact pleading required the plaintiff to plead
facts that tended to make each element of her claim plausible.72 By the
1920s, over half of the states had adopted some form of code pleading.
73
The modem era of pleading procedure begins with the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Responding to a belief that
common law pleading and code pleading were both fatally flawed,74 the
Federal Rules explicitly adopted a radical new pleading standard.
Specifically, Rule 8(a) required only that plaintiff provide "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' '75 The
new standard purported to eliminate arcane factual hierarchies and other
complexities that had come to dominate predecessor pleading formS,
76
replacing them with a less formal standard less susceptible to confusion or
gamesmanship.
But the "short and plain statement" requirement of Rule 8(a) is itself
inherently ambiguous, 77 and it remained a source of confusion to attorneys
71See id. at 34.
72 There was always substantial debate regarding the precise factual pleading requirements
under the various codes. See Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 YALE L.J.
259, 260-68 (1926) [hereinafter Clark, Code Pleading] (arguing that distinctions between law,
facts, and evidence were often meaningless; describing then-dominant fact pleading standard as
requiring pleading of "material" facts),
7 3 See Lloyd, supra note 69, at 35.
74 See, e.g., David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading and Standing, 65 CORNELL L.
REv. 390, 391-92 (1979) (collecting criticisms and discussing history of notice pleading and its
predecessors); see also Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure II:
Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1299 (1935).
75FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (1938) (original version). In December 2007, the text of the rule
was revised slightly to clarify pleading requirements as to damages and jurisdiction; the 1938
language governing statement of claims was left undisturbed. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (as
amended in 2007). For purposes of this Article, the term "plaintiff' is interchangeable with the
term "pleader" in Rule 8(a)(2) because the model developed in this Article focuses only upon a
unidirectional dispute between a unitary plaintiff interest and a unitary defendant interest.
76 See Lloyd, supra note 69, at 33.
77See Roberts, supra note 74, at 419-20 (describing the "semantic slipperiness" of Rule
8(a)(2) as "almost as fuzzy as the older code standard").
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and courts alike both before and after the Supreme Court's landmark 1957
decision in Conley v. Gibson.78 In that case, the Fifth Circuit had dismissed
a civil rights claim brought on behalf of African-American union members
who claimed their union was discriminating against them in favor of white
union members. Though the courts below had found against the plaintiffs
on different grounds, the Supreme Court nonetheless addressed the
sufficiency of plaintiffs' pleading, holding that a claim need only provide
the defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests. 79  Conley also permanently introduced the term
"notice pleading" into the judicial lexicon.8° In so doing, it is clear that the
Court was primarily interested in contrasting the simplified and liberalized
pleading standards under the Federal Rules with their arcane, demanding,
and complex predecessors: "The Federal Rules reject the approach that
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive
to the outcome . . ."81 The Court concluded by noting that "the purpose of
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. 82
If Conley had gone no further, perhaps courts ultimately would have
coalesced around a unitary notice pleading standard. But Conley instead
offered a peculiar amplification of the notice pleading standard, stating that
a plaintiffs complaint "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set offacts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief., 83 Taken to its literal
extreme, Conley thus seems to say that the mere pleading of a viable theory
of recovery is sufficient to state a claim, so long as there is some possible
set of facts that could be proved in support of that claim.
Conley quickly became the dominant case interpreting modem pleading
doctrine. And though it was cited extensively for its general approach to
notice pleading, tens of thousands of briefs and lower court opinions also
78355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
7 9
1d. at 47.
80Id. Judge and Professor Charles Clark, the architect of the Federal Rules, had been arguing
explicitly for "notice pleading" since at least the mid-1920s. See Clark, Code Pleading, supra
note 72, at 265; Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV.
517 (1925) [hereinafter Clark, Functions of Pleading].
81 Conley, 355 U.S. at 48.
81Id. The irony, of course, is that in the rare but real cost disparity conditions outlined in the
model, liberal pleading standards may actually impede a proper decision on the merits by
removing merits considerations from the equation entirely.
83 See id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
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expressly cite the "no set of facts" proposition.84 By the turn of the
twentieth century Conley had become a cornerstone of civil procedure
casebooks; before 2007, Conley had evolved into procedural holy writ or
something very like it.
As the Supreme Court continued to grapple with application of Rule
8(a)(2), 85  lower courts eventually diverged substantially in their
understanding of the Rule and of the import and meaning of Conley's "no
set of facts" language. By the end of the twentieth century, some courts
were flatly rejecting a literal and liberal interpretation of Conley86 while
others read Conley almost to the outer limits of its "no set of facts"
dictum. 87
In 2007, the Supreme Court once again took up the issue of pleading
standards, this time in the context of an antitrust claim brought against
incumbent local telephone companies. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
88
the Supreme Court seemingly endorsed a transsubstantive "plausibility"
pleading standard, holding that the "no set of facts" language in Conley had
"earned its retirement. '89  Instead, the Supreme Court held that Rule 8
requires factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the
speculative level." 90 The Court reaffirmed its earlier holding that courts
need not "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation." 91  In the antitrust context, the Supreme Court held that a
84 A Westlaw KeyCite search conducted on January 23, 2008, revealed over 87,000 positive
citations of Conley in the database, the vast majority of which appear to relate to its "no set of
facts" dictum regarding pleading standards.
85 See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346-48 (2005); Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27
(1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1974).
86See, e.g., Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting literal interpretation of Conley, requiring instead "direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory"
(citing Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984))).
87In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court characterized this extreme
interpretation as holding that "any statement revealing the theory of the claim will suffice unless
its factual impossibility may be shown from the face of the pleadings." 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1968
(2007).
8127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
89Id. at 1969.
9°1d. at 1959.
911d. at 1965 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
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complaint must provide "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest
that an agreement was made. 92
In defense of Conley's "retirement," Justice Souter flirted with but did
not fully endorse an economic theory of pleading. His majority opinion
acknowledged "in terrorem" settlement risks,93 and acknowledged that
"proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive. 94 In support of its
conclusion, the Court cites a 1999 memorandum to the federal judiciary's
Chair of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure finding that
discovery "accounts for as much as 90 percent of litigation costs when
discovery is actively employed." 95 Souter completes his analysis by noting
that effective judicial supervision may be hard to come by, and that neither
summary judgment scrutiny nor "lucid instructions to juries" come in time
to mitigate the risks.
96
Almost immediately after it was handed down, lower courts and
scholars began struggling to identify the true reach and meaning of the
Twombly opinion.97 Perhaps the most plausible interpretation of the case is
that it substitutes a somewhat relaxed and informal version of fact pleading
for certain antitrust claims at the very least and perhaps for a somewhat
broader swath of civil litigation.98  In any event, the furor regarding
92id.
931d. at 1959 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
94id.
951d. at 1967 (citing Niemeyer, supra note 32, at 357).
96
1d.
97 A November 14, 2008 Westlaw Keycite search yields 24,495 cases citing Twombly. See
also, Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN
BRIEF 121, 127-28 (2007); Allen Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal
Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 604-605 (2007); Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion To
Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1851, 1853, 1860-63, 1867-71, 1878-80
(2008). See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REv. 431 (2008);
Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We "Notice" Pleading Changes, 82. ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 893 (2008).
98just two weeks after Twombly, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam reversal in Erickson
v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007), where a pro se prisoner lawsuit had been dismissed by the
Tenth Circuit on pleading grounds. The Court held that "[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the
statement need only give the defendant fair notice" of the claim and grounds for relief." Erickson,
127 S. Ct. at 2200 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). To the extent Twombly
purported to undo part of Conley, the per curiamn reversal in Erickson clarified that the Court was
retiring only the "no set of facts" language, which had been, in the Court's view, extended well
beyond its intended meaning over time. Taken together, these two cases apparently indicate a
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Twombly continues to rage, and it is likely to be many years before courts
regain their equilibrium.
99
C. A Partial Economic Defense of Liberal Pleading
In light of this short history, a threshold economic question arises: Does
notice pleading in general make economic sense? Though the economic
costs and benefits of various pleading regimes are beyond precise
quantification, notice pleading is a priori defensible on economic grounds.
This defense has been articulated elsewhere in less explicitly economic
terms,100 but it consists of two essentially economic arguments: (1) Notice
pleading helps address potential informational asymmetry that otherwise
could affect the function of the dispute resolution market, and (2) notice
pleading helps mitigate potential agency costs associated with recourse to
the dispute resolution system.
But the benefits are only part of the story; there are also economic costs
associated with notice pleading. A proper pleading standard must also
account for those costs.
1. Informational Asymmetry
Defendants often have sole custody of relevant information critical to
the plaintiffs claim. If the operative pleading standard required plaintiff to
allege facts that she cannot reasonably be expected to know at the case's
inception, this informational asymmetry would in turn prevent proper
functioning of the litigation market. The plaintiffs failure to plead
unknowable facts could in some cases result in dismissal of a claim that
should have been successful, and net social welfare decreases as the
defendant unjustly retains wealth that should have compensated plaintiff for
her injury.
limited retreat from the most extreme lower court extensions of Conley, not a wholesale rejection
of notice pleading.
99See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Wreaks Havoc in the Lower Federal
Courts-Again, FINDLAW'S WRIT, Aug. 13, 2007,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20070813.html (describing confusion created by Twombly and
noting that "the hundreds of lower court opinions citing Twombly take a variety of positions on the
meaning of the case").
1°°See, e.g., Clark, Functions of Pleading, supra note 80, at 543-44 (arguing in favor of broad
adoption of notice pleading approach); see also Fairman, Heightened Pleading, supra note 1, at
556.
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Though there are certainly claim categories for which this informational
asymmetry is less of a problem, defendants in many circumstances do know
more than plaintiffs about the facts relevant to the claim. It is the
defendant, after all, who is accused of wrongdoing. It may be both highly
relevant and (from the plaintiffs perspective) unknowable ex ante whether
the defendant had been drinking just before an accident or whether the
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs business opportunities
by calling the plaintiff's customers and providing them with false
information. Moreover, the defendant has little independent incentive to fill
in the blanks. To address this problem, notice pleading gives the plaintiff
the benefit of the doubt early in the case.
2. Agency Costs
Notice pleading also minimizes agency costs associated with dispute
resolution. Judge Clark recognized this justification when he defended
liberal pleading standards as protecting the plaintiff from "deciding at his
peril on the correct legal theory applicable to his case."1 °1
Agency costs are inherent in litigation, with or without the formal
participation of attorneys. Each dispute that finds its way into the court
system is immediately packaged with the complex and sometimes
Byzantine trappings of legal procedure, and thus even (or perhaps
especially) the litigant who insists upon representing himself finds himself
in a metaphorical agency relationship with the underlying legal claim. That
is, the plaintiff-as-navigator of the legal system serves a metaphorical agent
for the plaintiff-as-injured-party for whom redress is sought.
U.S. civil courts do not require parties to hire attorneys, nor do they
provide attorneys as a matter of right. Accordingly, one can defend notice
pleading standards as protective of the pro se litigant's imperfections as
agent for his claims or defenses. In practice, of course, pro se litigants are
given additional leeway in pleading and other matters vis-d-vis represented
parties. 10 2 But similar agency issues arise even when the plaintiff is
represented by counsel.
10o See Clark & Moore, supra note 74, at 1 30 1.
102See, e.g., Young v. Corbin, 889 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Harris v.
Heinrich, 919 F.2d 1515, 1516 (1ith Cir. 1990); Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 204 (8th
Cir. 1987)); Brown v. Consol. Freightway, 152 F.R.D. 656, 660 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Harmon v.
O'Keefe, 149 F.R.D. 114, 116 (E.D. Va. 1993).
2009]
BAYLOR LAWREVIEW
The broader economics of litigation suggest that defendants will
routinely enjoy agency advantages over plaintiffs, even when both sides are
represented by counsel. Plaintiffs as a class are not interested in moral
victories-they rationally file suit when they believe that the defendant has
the ability to compensate them for their injuries. But plaintiff's own ability
to finance litigation at an equivalent level of skill and experience is not
always or even often relevant to her decision to file a claim. If plaintiffs
have fewer resources than defendants (in the aggregate, this will be the case
almost by definition, because judgment-proof defendants will not face suit
and plaintiff's resources are often irrelevant), they may be forced to hire
lower-quality agents to pursue their claims. The notice pleading standard
thus also arguably stands as a partial bulwark against systemic differences
in the quality of advocacy available to plaintiffs and defendants.
3. Countervailing Costs of Notice Pleading.
Despite its potential societal benefits, notice pleading is not costless.
U.S. civil procedure is often expensive business, and the economic
justifications for notice pleading cannot always justify the economic costs.
In particular, the lower the pleading standard, the greater the potential
disparity between defendant's and plaintiffs costs for several claim types.
This is because the range of permissible inquiry into defendant's affairs
increases as pleading specificity requirements decrease, especially for
claims in which the plaintiffs own conduct is of little moment. Fishing
expeditions are sometimes so expensive that the defendant will pay the
plaintiff to leave even a lake the defendant knows to be empty. The
following section explores the economic costs and benefits of pleading.
[Vol. 61:1
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IV. A NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PRETRIAL ECONOMICS1" 3
U.S. pretrial proceedings are facially complex. Every lawsuit consists
of a myriad of actual and potential interactions between parties and courts,
and no two litigatioi stories are ever exactly the same. But the apparent
complexity of the pretrial process is somewhat misleading, at least as it
relates to the interaction between economic incentives and pleading
standards. This Article derives a powerful, game theoretic model of pretrial
litigation incentives from several key variables and a few conservative
assumptions. The model is not infallibly predictive. But it nonetheless
provides a worthwhile starting point for gauging both the incentives facing
civil litigants and the ways in which pleading standards affect those
incentives.
A more technical summary of the model appears in the attached
Appendix. This section of the Article focuses instead upon a plain language
explanation of the model and its implications.
103Numerous scholars have modeled various aspects of the pretrial litigation process,
including models attempting to address the frivolous suit problem. None of these articles attempt
to address the role of pleading standards. For a representative sample, see generally Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1996); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989); Andrew F. Daugherty & Jennifer F.
Reinganum, Hush Money, 30 RAND J. ECON. 661 (1999); Philip L. Hersch, Indemnity, Settlement,
and Litigation: Comment and Extension, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1990); Keith N. Hylton,
Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187
(1993); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990); Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value
Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849 (2004); Geoffrey P.
Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1986); Barry Nalebuff, Credible
Pretrial Negotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198 (1987); I.P.L. P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit,
Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539 (1983); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397 (1993-1994); George L.
Priest, Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An Economic Analysis, I SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 163 (1982); Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the
Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 557 (1986); D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A
Model In Which Suits Are Brought For Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985);
Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for
the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); William H. Wagener, Modeling the
Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse In Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1887 (1987).
BA YLOR LAW REVIEW
A. Key Assumptions
Like most economic analyses of the litigation process, this model makes
several important simplifying assumptions. First and foremost, the model
assumes one rational, utility-maximizing litigating interest on each side of a
single dispute. 10 4 The model further assumes that each litigant attempts to
maximize its utility by maximizing its expected economic returns. This is
not to deny the existence of irrational litigants or of litigants who litigate on
principle rather than to maximize their economic well-being. But the great
majority of civil litigants desire only to litigate as efficiently as possible; in
the aggregate, economic rationality assumptions accurately describe most of
the actors participating in the civil litigation system. 105 To the extent that
the model is designed to yield prescriptive insights as to the optimal design
of the civil litigation system as a whole, economic rationality is an
appropriate assumption.
Second, the model treats each discrete litigated case as a separate game
between plaintiff and defendant. Thus, to the extent either litigating party is
concerned about consequences external to the modeled case, these concerns
are expressed as fully realized economic terms within the initial game,
rather than as additional iterations. For example, the concern that early
settlement of an objectively frivolous claim will yield additional costs in the
form of follow-on lawsuits is reflected in the model through a term
aggregating all of the expected external costs of settlement rather than by
modeling the defendant's decisions as a series of sequential games.
Similarly, if the plaintiff is concerned that filing and subsequently losing a
frivolous suit will affect her standing with a court in which she is likely to
be a repeat player, that expected cost is expressed as an external cost term
attendant with losing the case at summary judgment.
The model also assumes that the parties move sequentially within the
game, each responding to the opposing party's previous move. Thus, the
plaintiffs decision to file or not file the lawsuit is followed by the
defendant's decision to fight or settle, etc. The model further assumes
104The model thus captures class actions and mass actions where the plaintiffs share rough
unity of interest. It does not address scenarios in which parties sitting on the same side of the
courtroom nonetheless have potentially divergent interests.
05 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123-137 (1994).
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"perfect information"; that is, that each party knows how his opponent
moved at each previous node in the game.'
0 6
Similarly, for computational convenience only, the model assumes that
each party shares the same ex ante perceptions regarding both the merit and
the magnitude of the claim; that is, both plaintiff and defendant agree on the
probability of plaintiffs success at trial and on the size of the award in the
event of success. 10 7 For the same reason, the model assumes that the parties
also can predict their own and their opponent's litigation costs accurately, 10 8
and that pretrial activities will not affect either the expected value of the
claim at disposition or on opponents' litigation costs.
None of these assumptions substantially diminishes the real-world
predictive value of the model. Litigants tend to treat each actual or
potential suit as a single event, and even cases involving potential
externalities are often more easily modeled as discrete events with external
implications, rather than in series. Moreover, litigants typically move
sequentially in litigation and are aware of their adversaries' moves. And in
broad terms, at least, parties also can reasonably estimate their own costs
and their opponents' costs. Thus, the assumption that the pretrial process
can be modeled as a sequential game of perfect and complete information is
reasonable.
Because the model focuses upon the pleading nexus, it collapses the
pretrial process down to the minimum game necessary to replicate the
general sense of actual litigation. In concrete terms, this means that only
the major landmarks of the pretrial process merit decision nodes. Thus, the
analysis does not include Bayesian updating, instead assuming that the
parties retain the same assessments of their litigation prospects throughout
the pretrial process. The four critical nodes in the model are (1) the
plaintiffs "sue/do nothing" decision point, (2) the defendant's decision to
resist or offer to settle, (3) if the defendant makes an offer, the plaintiff's
decision to accept or refuse, and (4) if defendant resists, the plaintiffs
decision to try or drop the case. 10 9 Relevant data include each party's
106 "Perfect information" is not to be confused with "complete information," a different state
of the world in which each party is also fully aware of all parties' possible strategies and payoffs.
107Changing this assumption would complicate any given analysis but would not affect any of
the relevant insights derived from the model.
10 Differing estimates of cost create additional computational complexity and can in certain
circumstances yield different results, but they do not affect the validity of the model.
'°9See, e.g., ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION To GAME
THEORY 59-62 (3d ed. 2001).
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expected value of trial, expected direct litigation costs, and the expected
external costs associated with various possible decisions. Because the game
as modeled is one of perfect and complete information, it is fully
determined and thus amenable to backwards induction analysis.110
B. Building the Model
A rational, risk-neutral, profit-maximizing plaintiff will file a lawsuit
only if she expects to benefit financially from its filing. Thus, she will file
only if the expected value of the suit-either from trial or from
settlement-exceeds the costs of filing and prosecuting the claim. In the
simplest game theoretical models of the litigation process, the decision to
file a lawsuit involves only an assessment of whether the costs of filing and
litigating the case are less than the probability-adjusted expected verdict. If
the expected net economic costs of filing and prosecuting the lawsuit are
less than the expected value of the claim at trial, then the plaintiff has an
economic incentive to file. Conversely, if the plaintiffs expected costs
exceed her expected gain; traditional models suggest that she will have no
incentive to bring the suit.
But a more realistic model must account for the realities of the U.S. civil
litigation system, and especially for the fact that much of the cost of
litigation is unavoidable once the pleading bar is passed. The Rules
contemplate a world with extensive, costly pretrial discovery and minimal
judicial oversight. And it is a world where each party expects to bear its
own pretrial costs. Thus, the court's decision at the pleading nexus to
dismiss the case or to allow it to proceed is the primary driver of the pretrial
cost function. Once a case survives pleading challenges, it is difficult if not
impossible to mitigate litigation costs under prevailing legal standards
absent some effective means of filtering pretrial discovery."'
Several economic variables are critical to any realistic model. First and
foremost, the model must reflect each party's expected pretrial litigation
costs-filing fees, discovery costs, expert witness fees, etc.
112
110 See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 50-55 (1994).
'See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (authorizing "no
evidence" summary judgment only after there has been adequate time for discovery).
12As discussed in Part II.B., supra, discovery costs are likely to be the single largest
component of pretrial costs, often by a substantial majority.
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Second, the model must incorporate an estimate of the outcome at trial.
This is typically expressed as a verdict amount adjusted by the probability
of obtaining that verdict-in economic terms, an expected value of trial.
The model also must account for the external costs associated with
specific litigation decisions. For example, the model should incorporate the
external costs to the plaintiff of trying or dropping a case, and the external
costs to the defendant of settling a case without trial. Thus, if a plaintiff
will damage its reputation by dropping a frivolous claim after filing or by
pursuing a frivolous claim to disposition, its disposition/dismissal payoffs
should incorporate negative external cost terms.113
Similarly, a defendant's decision to settle may carry with it external
costs, in the form of likely follow-on litigation or reputational harm, for
example. If settling a specific claim will encourage other similarly situated
parties to file suit, the defendant's "settlement" payoff must incorporate a
negative external cost term as well.
Finally, the model must also include the parties' expected trial costs in
the event that the defendant chooses not to settle the case. If an equilibrium
settlement amount exists, it can be derived from those terms.
Consider a hypothetical suit involving Donald Defendant and Peggy
Plaintiff, one in which Donald (and Peggy's) objective assessment of
defense liability risk is zero-the paradigmatically "frivolous" suit. 114 If
Peggy files the claim, Donald does not expect to have any trial costs at all
(the case is destined for resolution in Donald's favor on Donald's summary
judgment motion), and the expected verdict is zero as well. Nonetheless,
Donald may still face an overwhelming incentive to settle. If Donald
believes that his pretrial costs will be $12, and that he will suffer $3 in
external costs (reputation damages, copycat suits, etc.) from a pretrial
surrender, he should be willing to settle for up to $9 in lieu of pursuing the
claim all the way to a successful summary judgment. Once Donald
accounts for his external costs, he is truly indifferent as to who receives his
money.
But whether Peggy will file the negative-expected value suit in the first
place requires putting the two pieces of the puzzle together. In a game of
perfect and symmetrical information in which each party shares the same
113 This is most likely when the plaintiff or its agents are likely repeat players in front of the
same tribunal.
114See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 519, 524-33 (1997)
(exploring the difficulty inherent in defining "frivolous" litigation).
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beliefs regarding the relevant variables, the outcome is fully determined.
Thus, Peggy's "file/don't file" decision can be divined through backwards
induction, informed by the interaction of Peggy's own cost/benefit calculus
and Donald's. 115 If Donald's expected costs of suit, minus the external
costs of settlement, exceed Peggy's expected costs of filing, she will have
an incentive to sue regardless of the substantive merits of her claim.
So, if Peggy anticipates that an objectively frivolous claim (expected
verdict of $0) will cost her $5 to litigate through pretrial, 16 she will
nonetheless have an incentive to file suit if Donald's expected pretrial costs,
less his external costs of settlement, are over $5. For example, again
assume Donald expects to win at summary judgment with 100% certainty,
but expects to pay $12 to get to the summary judgment node and would
suffer only $3 in external costs from a pretrial settlement. 17 Donald would
thus be indifferent as to paying $12 to litigate the case to dismissal,
suffering no external costs along the way, or paying Peggy $9 in settlement
and suffering $3 in external effects from that settlement. Because Peggy's
total economic cost of litigating the suit through pretrial is only $5, she will
file her claim, anticipating that Donald will have an incentive to settle
before summary judgment for more than Peggy expects to pay to litigate the
claim.
Once Peggy has filed her suit, Donald has an incentive to settle, and
should in fact be willing to settle for any amount up to his pretrial-costs-
less-external-costs indifference value. But just as Peggy was able to
execute a bit of litigation judo through her knowledge of Donald's pretrial
". See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 110, at 50-55.
1 6 One avenue for further research would involve explicit modeling of the agent-principal
difficulties inherent in cases handled by attorneys. As a general rule, the model predicts that the
agent-principal problem would tend to reduce the risks of "frivolous" suits because an additional
layer of agency increases potential external costs. In this model, external costs tend to reduce the
incentive for strategic behavior on both sides, by (1) increasing the plaintiff's total expected
pretrial costs and (2) decreasing the amount for which the defendant would be willing to settle. It
is possible to imagine scenarios in which the agent-principal relationship pushes incentives in the
opposite direction (for example if a lawyer seeks a specific reputation in the marketplace), but
they are less likely.
1 17Another area for further refinement: accounting for the likely inverse relationship between
the amount of settlement and the magnitude of expected external costs. This model assumes that
the external costs of settlement are fixed; a slightly more complex model might adjust the external
costs as a function of settlement amount. The core insights of the model do not change, but it
would impact both the outcomes of certain close cases and the likely settlement within the range
(tending to push the settlement down to the plaintiff's minimum).
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costs, so too can Donald use Peggy's expected costs against her. At the end
of the day, Peggy is indifferent to any combination of costs and settlement
that will yield her the highest net return. In the hypothetical above, Peggy
can be made to spend $5 and get nothing in return. Knowing this, Donald
will make Peggy an offer she can't refuse: Before the parties incur pretrial
costs, Donald will settle the claim for $4. Peggy's net payoff is the $4
settlement, and Donald's net losses are $7, including external costs.
The case ultimately settles for $4 because Donald's threat to force
Peggy to expend pretrial resources is credible. By insisting on his legal
rights before the court, Donald can require Peggy to comply with discovery
requests and otherwise perform her pretrial obligations, at minimal
additional cost to him. 118 If Peggy were to demand more than $4 in
settlement, Donald could simply enforce Peggy's pretrial obligations, thus
cutting into her net proceeds.' 19
Peggy does not enjoy a reciprocal ability to force Donald to settle for a
greater percentage of his indifference value, because her threat to impose
costs on Donald is not credible. Suppose Peggy seeks more than Donald's
initial $4 offer, claiming that she, too, will impose costs on Donald such
that his net losses increase. From Donald's perspective, any amount Peggy
forces him to spend on pretrial litigation costs decreases Donald's
indifference settlement value proportionally. For example, if in the
hypothetical above, Donald expends $4 of his expected $12 in pretrial costs,
his indifference value is now considerably lower. It would cost him only $8
more to obtain summary judgment, thus he would now only be willing to
settle for $5, since his total payout at settlement would also include $3 in
external costs. Peggy's threat to impose costs on Donald is credible ex
ante, but she cannot use that threat to increase her settlement amount above
the difference between her expected costs and Donald's indifference value.
118 In this model, enforcement (filing of the claim, promulgation of discovery requests,
motions to compel, etc.) is assumed to be effectively costless to the parties; these costs are
generally nominal relative to other pretrial costs. A subsequent iteration of the model might
incorporate enforcement costs, but it is unlikely to add much to the analysis.
'
19 Peggy's external costs of suit only enter into the equation if Donald's impositional rights
extend that far. Though his threat to force Peggy to expend $5 in pretrial litigation costs is
credible, his threat to force Peggy to incur external costs may not be, because it would require that
Donald expend his full pretrial costs. Since Donald ultimately has an incentive to settle,
regardless, he may only be able to obtain a discount off of his full indifference amount
proportional to plaintiffs internal costs of litigation.
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Thus, at the end of the day, on these facts Peggy will file suit without
any expectation of a merits recovery, and the case will ultimately settle for
$4.
C. General Implications of the Model
If this model captures the essence of the real-world litigation process,
there is a real risk of cost arbitrage only when substantial pretrial cost
disparity favors the plaintiff. But empirical evidence regarding the
proportionality or disproportionality of pretrial economic costs in litigated
claims is hard to come by for two reasons. First, a huge percentage of
litigated cases settle-70% or more according to one widely cited study. 2°
Thus, although researchers have explored average litigation costs in a
variety of case types, they cannot reliably estimate the parties' full expected
costs of litigation. Rather, the existing estimates tend to show how much
money the parties actually spent to reach resolution, whenever it occurred.
Second, it is difficult if not impossible to estimate the various external costs
that may arise in connection with pursuit or settlement of claims. Existing
research thus tends to focus only upon the accounting costs of litigation;
there is no obvious source of empirical data on the external costs associated
with various litigation behaviors.
That said, there is reason to believe that most litigated cases do not
involve substantial cost disproportionality favoring plaintiffs. Intuition,
common sense, and the available data suggest that most pretrial costs are
either roughly equal as to plaintiffs and defendants, or that they favor
defendants rather than plaintiffs. In other words, the litigation market is
often self-correcting. But several types of real-world claims do seem to
present a risk of systemic cost disparity favoring plaintiffs. These types of
claims, while no more than a small fraction of litigated cases by number,
are problematic. And as discussed in Part V, the risks presented by these
claims can be limited by adoption of a stricter default pleading standard
applicable only to such claims. 1
21
12 0See Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE
161, 162-64 (1986); see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994).
'
21See infra Part V.D. 1-3.
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1. A Note About Agency
Civil litigation and agency relationships go hand-in-hand. Most
important among these are the attorney-client and client-insurer
relationships present in much civil litigation. But there has been no
significant research on the effects that agency relationships have as to the
appropriate pleading standards. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, in the
pleading context, these relationships on balance tend to mitigate the risk of
opportunism rather than increase it.
For example, for each of the primary agency relationships-
plaintiff/plaintiff's attorney, defendant/defendant's attorney,
defendant/insurer-the presence of the agent tends to increase the external
costs associated with filing or settlement of spurious claims. Though the
plaintiff herself may suffer few external consequences for the filing of a
frivolous claim, her attorney has a reputation to protect; the presence of a
plaintiff's attorney-especially one likely to be a repeat player either before
a particular court or against particular defendants or their insurers-will
decrease the economic attractiveness of opportunistic pleading by
increasing the plaintiff's external costs of filing. The defense attorney cares
about her reputation as well, and a reputation for settling nuisance suits is
not likely to attract clients.122
The story is the same for insurers when they are present in a case. In
fact, the presence of insurance can dramatically increase external costs of
settlement, because an insurer's reputation is effectively its business. A
single defendant may worry about follow-on litigation to some degree, but
an insurer whose business is built on maximizing premiums and minimizing
claim payments may be far more concerned about the reputational effects of
settlement. And because insurers typically cover similar risks for many
clients, the risk of follow-on litigation is not limited to the specific
defendant in the case; insurers are concerned about follow-on litigation
against other insured entities as well. Thus, the agency relationship
between insurers and their insured, while it may have perverse
consequences elsewhere, tends to mitigate the risk of cost arbitrage by
increasing the defendant's external costs of settlement for frivolous claims.
12 2 The traditional agency tensions between attorney and client-maximizing fees, minimizing
effort, etc.-usually have little effect upon the pleading calculus. Contingent fee plaintiff's
attorneys' "file/don't file" incentives are roughly aligned with their clients' incentives. Hourly
attorneys on both sides face obvious incentives to maximize revenue in each case, but those are
likely held in check by countervailing longitudinal incentives to maximize revenue over time.
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2. Plaintiffs Costs
a. Internal Costs
All else equal, the risk of cost arbitrage increases as the plaintiffs
internal pretrial costs of litigation decrease relative to the defendant's.
Thus, holding defendant's costs constant, we are less concerned when the
plaintiffs anticipated pretrial costs are high. In abstract terms, the
plaintiffs internal pretrial costs are likely to be high when she possesses
substantial discoverable information. This occurs primarily when one or
both of two conditions are satisfied: (1) the plaintiff's transaction with the
defendant is in and of itself relevant to the existence or nonexistence of
legal liability, or (2) the plaintiff's damages will be subject to substantial
inquiry and potential dispute. In both situations, the defendant will have
legitimate need to inquire deeply into plaintiffs affairs. This inquiry will
increase the plaintiffs costs.
In the vast majority of litigated cases, both conditions are satisfied: the
plaintiffs transactions with the defendant are directly relevant to the
liability inquiry and the plaintiffs damages are genuinely contestable and
subject to substantial inquiry. Take, for example, one of the most common
types of civil litigation, the automobile accident tort suit. In those cases, the
transaction at issue routinely requires substantial inquiry into the plaintiffs
own behavior and perceptions: Did the plaintiffs own negligence cause or
contribute to the accident? What does the plaintiff remember about the
relevant events, and how does her recollection differ from the defendant's,
the police report, and the physical evidence? As important, the typical
automobile accident tort claim involves substantial inquiry into the
plaintiffs claimed damages; in fact, this is often the most hotly contested
and expensive component of the litigation.
When the plaintiffs involvement and activities in the relevant
transaction is important to the liability determination, plaintiff will incur
costs in connection with her case. The same is true for contestable damages
claims; a fight over damages implies direct and opportunity costs for the
plaintiff in the form of traditional and expert discovery at the very least.
Automobile accident tort suits are not the only type of litigation in
which the typical plaintiff bears high internal pretrial costs. Virtually every
form of personal injury tort suit, breach of contract suit, and many statutory
causes of action (e.g., single-instance employment discrimination)
inherently require searching inquiry into the plaintiffs interactions with the
defendant and into the plaintiffs purported injuries. And as discussed
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below, in most of these sorts of cases, the defendant's own cost structure is
likely to mirror the plaintiff's-the defendant's possession of additional
information in certain types of cases is likely to be counterbalanced to a
large extent, if not outright exceeded, by the costs the plaintiff incurs
proving her damages.
The available data, while admittedly incomplete and imperfect, bears
this out. A 1986 Rand Corporation study found rough parity between
plaintiffs nominal litigation costs and defendant's costs in tort cases
generally-$8,000 for plaintiff to $10,000 for defendant. 12 3 According to a
1988 Rand study, the cost disparity actually favored defendants for aviation
accident claims; defendants paid an average of $49,000 to the plaintiffs'
$72,000.124 And though a 1980s study of asbestos claims showed a small
disparity favoring plaintiffs, by the 1990s, that disparity had been
reversed.12 ' Keeping in mind that these data fail to reflect the full expected
economic costs of litigation (or even to differentiate between tried cases and
settled cases), the cost disparities between plaintiffs and defendants are
actually quite small. After factoring in expected external costs, one might
well expect that disparities apparently favoring plaintiffs disappear entirely
or in fact shift to favor defendants in most common types of claim.
Conversely, claims in which the plaintiff's internal pretrial costs are low
tend to be claims for which there will be little inquiry into the plaintiffs
activities or damages. The paradigmatic case is the "fraud on the market"
claim, in which the plaintiffs sole interaction with the defendant is through
the purchase of the plaintiffs goods, services, or stock. 126 Other types of
similar internal cost structures may be found in, for example, "pattern or
practice" employment discrimination claims or certain types of creditor
claims against bankrupt estates. The key is that in these cases, the
defendant can impose few costs upon the plaintiff during the pretrial phase.
In the "fraud on the market" cases, for example, defendant's direct
discovery options are remarkably limited: How much did you buy? When
did you buy? How much did you pay? The remainder of the inquiry
123 JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, THE RAND CORPORATION, COSTS AND
COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION, R-3391-ICJ (1986).
124 JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., THE RAND CORPORATION, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID
IN AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION xiii, xvi (1988).
125 STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., THE RAND CORPORATION, ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS
AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT 60 (2002), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented-briefings/DB397/.
126 Consumer Antitrust, securities fraud, and other similar claims come to mind.
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focuses entirely upon defendant's actions: Did it conspire with its
competitors? Did it conceal material information from investors?
27
b. External Costs
The plaintiffs external costs of suit are largely dependent upon the
reputational consequences the plaintiff and her attorney will suffer if they
file a frivolous claim.12 8 A single frivolous claim that nonetheless yields a
settlement is unlikely to generate substantial external costs for the plaintiff;
viewed from the outside, this settlement is arguably more likely to signal a
potentially meritorious claim than a nuisance suit payment. Thus, the real
issues are whether repeated such filings and settlements, in the aggregate,
may generate external costs, and in particular whether unsuccessful suits,
dismissed by the court as frivolous, will impose external costs on the
plaintiff as well.
Though precise quantification of these costs is impossible, intuition and
common sense suggest a few situations in which external costs might exist
for plaintiffs. In particular, plaintiffs are likely to face higher external costs
when repeat player concerns-both between and among the same litigant
and agent pools or before the same courts-are the greatest. Consider the
typical automobile accident claim again. In these cases, external costs to
the plaintiff are likely to be relatively high for several reasons. First, the
nature of the personal injury plaintiffs bar and the venue rules in most
jurisdictions 12 suggest that lawyers will necessarily be appearing before the
same judges repeatedly. In such circumstances, the reputational
consequences (primarily to the plaintiff s attorney) of filing spurious claims
may be high. 130 Second, these cases tend to yield repeat games between the
127This deliberately ignores certain costs plaintiffs may eventually incur, most notably expert
costs and discovery review costs. But plaintiffs cannot generally be forced into these expenditures
in the same way they can be forced to search for and produce discoverable information. Expert
costs may be unavoidable in some cases, but even then, defendants cannot rely upon parity of cost
imposition functions to prevent opportunistic pleading. These costs will likely mirror each other
on either side, leaving discovery costs to determine parity or disparity.
128For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that a plaintiff suffers no external costs for the
filing of a claim ultimately found to have merit.
129 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (generally fixing venue where defendant resides or where "a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred").
130 Though they are highest when the plaintiff's frivolous claims are ultimately revealed
publicly as such, external costs can also accrue in certain environments even if the plaintiffs
attorney is able to obtain settlements.
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plaintiffs attorney, the local pool of defense attorneys, and the area's
important insurers. Lawyers with a reputation for filing frivolous claims
ultimately put both their earning potential and their social status at risk.
If a given type of claim systematically yields similar reputational
consequences to the plaintiff or her attorney, that category of suit is less
likely to raise opportunistic pleading concerns. In addition, claim types in
which attorney-agents are equally likely to end up on either side (e.g.,
bilateral business disputes) are also likely to bring with them higher relative
external costs, as attorneys seek to protect their reputation as to both
potential clients and potential attorney adversaries. Though the "external
costs" effect for plaintiffs is likely substantially less significant than the
internal cost function in dissuading opportunistic pleading, it nonetheless
may be an important part of the litigation calculus in a surprising
percentage of cases.
Cases involving low potential external costs bring a concomitantly
higher risk of frivolous claims. Again, "fraud on the market" cases provide
an illustrative example. In these cases, plaintiff's attorneys are often
national class action firms with very little expectation of repeat litigation
before a particular court. 131 In addition, though these attorneys may sue the
same companies and fight with the same opposing counsel more than once,
intra-community social pressures are much less likely to constrain behavior.
These cases also visit few or no external consequences upon the plaintiffs
themselves; the class action litigant may not even be aware of her
participation until settlement, if ever, and even class representatives are
unlikely to suffer reputational or other external harm for lending their
names to frivolous suits.
3. Defendant's Costs
a. Internal Costs
All else equal, the risk of cost arbitrage suits increases as the
defendant's internal pretrial costs increase relative to the plaintiffs.
Holding plaintiffs costs constant, we are more concerned when the
defendant's pretrial costs are relatively high. Thus, the defendant's internal
costs story is essentially the negative image of the plaintiffs. For example,
claims in which the defendant's internal litigation costs may typically be
131 Unless they affirmatively prefer that court, of course.
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relatively low include automobile tort claims, in which the defendant is
likely to have similar or lower net costs because (1) he is not generally
claiming damages, and (2) inquiry into the plaintiffs own damages is
substantial. In breach of contract and other business cases, the defense's
internal costs are likely quite similar to plaintiffs; it takes about as much
effort to tell a "he said" story as the "she said" version.
As important, defendant's pretrial costs can for certain claim types be
mitigated and managed through sequential or piecemeal case development.
Thus, when a defendant's aggregate expected pretrial costs seem
disproportionately large vis-d-vis the plaintiffs, the disparity may diminish
or disappear if the defendant can persuade the court to limit initial discovery
to a specific element of liability or damages. In a toxic tort case, for
example, the defendant may be able to reduce pretrial expenditures by
persuading the court to limit initial discovery to whether the plaintiff was
exposed to the defendant's product. If the plaintiff cannot establish
exposure, summary judgment will be appropriate under Celotex, regardless
of the defendant's abstract culpability.
By contrast, the cases with the largest internal defense costs tend to be
those (1) in which the scope and depth of genuinely discoverable
information under Rule 26(b)(2) is significant, and (2) without an obvious
factual transaction around which to limit discovery. Again, the "fraud on
the market" cases are illustrative. In certain antitrust cases, for example, the
defendant's summary judgment liability case effectively rests upon proving
that it did not conspire with its competitors to raise prices or limit output.
In securities fraud cases, the defendant similarly must prove that it did not
conceal material information from investors.
At trial, of course, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof as to these
matters. But, summary judgment law temporarily turns the burden on its
ear. The "after adequate time for discovery" requirement essentially
guarantees the plaintiff a full opportunity to inquire into the existence of
liability. For most other claim types, this inquiry is inherently self-limiting;
the plaintiff can inquire into the details of the transaction giving rise to her
claim and little else. By contrast, fraud on the market claims arguably
allow plaintiffs to look (or more accurately, to force defendants to look,
largely at their own expense) far and wide for evidence that the defendant
violated the law. Depending upon the operative pleading standard, there
may be no obvious factual transaction upon which courts can focus and thus
[Vol. 61:1
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limit plaintiffs inquiry.' 32 The plaintiff can force the defendant to search a
staggering percentage of his records-email, hard copy files, archives,
etc.-looking for a potentially nonexistent needle in the haystack. And
summary judgment will only be available to the defendant after the court is
satisfied that enough of the haystack has been searched.
133
b. External Costs
Defendant's external costs generally arise out of the fallout from
settlement. 34  If a defendant's settlement of a case will induce copycat
lawsuits or harm defendant's reputation, this reduces defendant's incentive
to settle by increasing its overall expected costs of settlement. By contrast,
if settlement has few external consequences, defendants will, ceteris
paribus, be more likely to pay the arbitrage.
The presence of liability insurance likely significantly increases the
external costs of settlement vis-ti-vis cases in which insurance is not
involved. The risk of repeat suits against that particular defendant remains
constant, and the risk of similar suits against other insurance company
clients increases. Thus, the presence of insurance will tend to mitigate the
risk of opportunistic pleading in most cases.
In many cases, the defendant's attorneys may also incur external costs if
they encourage settlement of spurious claims. In potential repeat-player
environments, defense counsel may be less likely to encourage settlement,
because she is worried about obtaining and retaining clients.
As before, the classic automobile tort case and the typical "fraud on the
market" claim represent different ends of the defendant's external costs
spectrum. Automobile accident claims are repeat player at virtually every
level; the same attorneys, defense counsel, insurance companies and courts
simply play mix-and-match over time. In those cases, therefore, though the
defendant himself may have little at stake externally (unless he is a serially
bad driver), the defendant's attorney and insurer have strong incentives to
take the long view. An insurer with a reputation for quick settlement
... See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 640.
.
33 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134 There are sometimes positive external payoffs from trying cases, but the model subsumes
those benefits in the external cost term related to settlement. In other words, instead of including a
positive externality term in the defendant's trial payoff corresponding to the defendant's decision
to "send a message" to other potential plaintiffs, the model accounts for that incentive as a
negative externality term at settlement.
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invites additional claims, and thus an attorney with a reputation for quick
settlement loses insurance company clients.
On the other hand, the "fraud on the market" case may involve
significantly fewer external costs for defendant if the plaintiff's side has
aggregated claims. In a price-fixing case, a single consumer's claim is not
an attractive candidate for settlement, because settlement of one claim may
induce thousands of additional claims. 135  External costs of settlement
would therefore be high. By contrast, the defendant's external costs of
settlement as to an aggregated claim (a putative antitrust class action, for
example) may be relatively low; price-fixing claims are largely sui generis,
and the defendant may rationally discount the expected cost of follow-on
litigation. As if not more important, many "fraud on the market" claims are
not typically covered by insurance, 36 thus eliminating the insurer's multiple
client repeat player incentives to deter future litigation.
4. Summary and Implications
In summary, the risk of cost arbitrage is highest when: (1) the plaintiff's
internal costs of litigation are lowest, as in claims in which the plaintiff has
little discoverable information in its possession, custody, or control; (2) the
plaintiffs external costs of filing a frivolous suit are lowest, as in claims in
which the plaintiff's attorneys are unlikely to be repeat players in the same
court or against the same insurer/payer; (3) the defendant's internal costs of
litigation are highest, as in claims in which the defendant's discovery costs
are high and cannot be filtered or sequenced to minimize expenditures; and
(4) the defendant's external costs of settlement are lowest, as in claims in
which there is little risk of reputational harm or copycat litigation and there
is no insurance coverage.
The model thus has two primary real-world implications. First and
foremost, there is a relatively low risk of opportunistic pleading in most
types of civil claims. Though full empirical analysis is beyond the scope of
the current Article, there is reason to believe that many of the most common
135This claim is also unlikely to be filed, because the economics are unfavorable for the
plaintiff.
136In the last several years, insurers have begun to offer so-called "side C" or "entity"
coverage in their Directors and Officers (D&O) liability policies. Those policies often expressly
cover securities fraud claims, but do not typically cover antitrust claims. To the extent side C
policies trigger external cost concerns at the insurer level, they will tend to reduce plaintiffs
incentives to file frivolous claims.
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forms of civil litigation-automobile torts, breach of contract cases,
intellectual property disputes, etc.-inherently involve or can be made to
involve 137 relative parity in pretrial costs, or even disparity in favor of the
defendant. Thus, stricter pleading standards across all claim types are
unnecessary. In addition, the presence of insurance, especially as to large
corporate defendants that would otherwise be capable of paying judgments
on their own, actually reduces the risk of opportunistic pleading by
increasing the external costs of settlement. In most cases, the cost
incentives are such that plaintiffs are likely to file suit only if they believe
the net expected value of their claim at trial to be positive.
Second, there is a real risk of frivolous suit in the perfect storm. When
cost disparity significantly favors the plaintiff, the expected trial value of
her claim becomes irrelevant to her filing decision. In the extreme, the
economic model predicts that a plaintiff may file suit-and the defendant
may settle the claim-even when the plaintiffs claim is wholly frivolous.
13 8
D. The Type I/Type H Correlation Complication
Though the model itself does not expressly speak to this issue, there is
likely a significant correlation between the types of claims likely to raise
Type I risks and the types of claims likely to raise Type II risks. Claims
most likely to raise Type I risks are those where the plaintiff's own
activities are less relevant to the claim; they are typically claims in which
most of the relevant discovery costs are borne by defendants. But when a
defendant faces disproportionately higher discovery costs, it is usually
because he has control over more relevant information than the plaintiff
does. Thus, cases in which the model predicts a substantial risk of cost
arbitrage may also be cases in which the plaintiffs ex ante ignorance of
relevant facts might lead to Type II error in the form of erroneous dismissal.
This correlation presents a conundrum: the cases in which a stricter
pleading standard is most justified on Type I error grounds are precisely the
cases in which a more liberal pleading standard is most justified on Type II
error grounds. The prescriptive goal of this Article is to locate a solution to
the Type I and Type II conundrum that adequately mitigates both types of
risk.
137 Most notably, through the filing of counterclaims, which often substantially increase the
original plaintiff's costs.
138 As discussed below, it is possible to have a rational probabilistic belief in a suit's merit,
even in the absence of objective indicia of worth. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
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V. A POSSIBLE PRESCRIPTIVE APPLICATION: BALANCING THE SCALES
A. Theories of Procedural Justice
Because this Article ultimately offers a prescription for procedural
reform, a brief discussion of competing procedural justice theories is
appropriate. After all, commentators and critics often have quite different
ideas regarding not only the appropriate shape of procedure, but also
regarding the very goals of the civil procedural system. The sketch that
follows demonstrates the near-universal appeal of this Article's approach.
Professor Larry Solum offers an immensely useful taxonomy of various
competing philosophical approaches to procedural justice. 39  In general
terms, Solum offers three possible philosophical focal points for the
development of procedural systems: accuracy, balancing, and participation.
That is, the three potential goals of procedure are (1) maximizing the
accuracy (whether on a systemic basis or in case-specific terms) of legal
proceedings such that litigation outcomes comport with the substantive law,
140 (2) balancing the various relevant factors and values tied up in civil
litigation in some socially optimal way, 14 1 or (3) ensuring that interested
parties have an opportunity to participate meaningfully in legal
proceedings, perhaps independent of the effect that participation may have
on the substantive result. 1
42
139See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004); see
also Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem With Contractarian Theories of
Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REv. 485 (2003).
140 Solum, supra note 139, at 244-52.
141 Solum offers at least two competing versions of a "balancing" approach, one expressly
utilitarian and consequentialist, and one based upon deontological notions of fairness and rights.
Id. at 253, 257. In the utilitarian version, the balancing approach would seek to minimize net
social costs of litigation, which, as Solum expressly notes is an approach similar to many
traditional law and economics approaches. See id. at 253-54. In the deontological version of
balancing, Solum posits instead a system designed to result in maximization of other, potentially
noneconomic values. Id. at 257-59. Both approaches are properly characterized as seeking
imperfect procedural justice. Id. at 253.
142tn his article, Solum ultimately argues for a theory of procedural justice that recognizes
and in fact gives primacy to participation as an independently desirable and irreducible value. See
id. at 305-08. Whether Solum's lexical ordering is preferable is irrelevant; the asymmetry
problem associated with modem U.S. pleading standards exists even if participation is the only
value we seek to protect.
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1. Descriptive Accuracy
None of these theories is accurate and complete as a descriptive
matter. 143 Instead, to the extent a coherent "philosophy of civil procedure"
can be extracted from the patchwork of existing rules and standards, it is a
theoretical pastiche of all three.' 44  While the system contains features
intended to maximize substantive accuracy, it does not do so without regard
for cost-instead, it routinely considers matters of economic cost when
designing procedural features. Nor does it balance costs solely on
utilitarian grounds; our procedural jurisprudence frequently emphasizes
rights and fairness-including "participation" values-despite the high
probability that those rights sometimes cost more to protect than any purely
economic benefits derived from their protection. And even the strongest
articulations of participation values found in case law recognize that there
are practical limits to the access that can be afforded, both in terms of the
economic costs it imposes upon the system and other parties, and in terms
of the countervailing impact participation one party can have on the rights
of others.
In fact, the Federal Rules themselves expressly recognize the mixed
nature of "procedural justice." Rule 1 embraces the tension in a single
clause, admonishing courts to construe and administer the Rules "to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action ....
Further evidence of mixed theoretical heritage abounds, from rules designed
to allow for summary disposal of claims that fail to meet certain evidentiary
thresholds146 to Supreme Court pronouncements that explicitly privilege
constitutional values over speed and efficiency. 47 The Supreme Court has
authorized an explicitly economic situational balancing of burdens in the
43 See id. at 243.
44Id. at 242 ("In this section we examine three simple ... models of procedural justice that
are, at least partially, implicit in current practice.").
145 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
146 See, e.g., id. 56(c).
147 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) ("'The establishment of prompt efficacious
procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest .... But the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed one might fairly say of the Bill of
Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the
fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy
that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre
ones."' (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972))).
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procedural context. 148 But the same Court later speaks reverently of the
"deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in
court" in rejecting a liberal application of preclusion doctrine. 149
When attempting to describe the theoretical underpinnings of our
existing system of civil procedure, it is impossible to disentangle the
various strands. U.S. civil procedure is about accuracy. But, it is also about
balancing of costs and other rights and values, and it is about participation
as an independent value with independent, intrinsic worth. And though
commentators may order their preferences differently, all of these values
generally play a part in normative conceptions of procedure as well.
2. The Irrelevance of Normative Preferences
But, to the extent proceduralists differ with respect to their normative
preferences, those differences do not necessarily imply corresponding
differences in pleading standard preferences. All serious theories of
procedural justice ultimately aim for some sort of fairness: fair results, fair
balancing of the net costs and benefits of litigation, fair weighing of
important rights and values, or fair access to the courts. The economic
analysis of pleading identifies a set of incentives that can in certain
circumstances call into question the fairness of civil litigation under
virtually any definition of "fair." Assuming a symmetrical fairness baseline
in which there is no systemic ex ante preference for or against a category of
litigants, the operative normative theory of procedural justice is ultimately
irrelevant.
Regardless of our normative conception of procedural justice, the
economic analysis set forth in Part IV is troubling. For example, the
analysis suggests that under certain cost disparity conditions, the
substantive accuracy of civil litigation is suspect; defendants will settle
claims without regard for their merits if the price is right. For these claims,
stricter pleading standards may improve accuracy of result by limiting the
incidence of such settlements.
Because the model predicts inefficient filing and settlements, it also
necessarily suggests excessive social costs resulting from such claims.
Provided the cure is not worse than the disease, a stricter pleading standard
148See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
149See Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson
County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)).
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for high-risk claims will also decrease net social costs in ways that promote
utilitarian balancing goals.
50
Finally, the model also suggests that under certain conditions,
defendants' participation rights may be substantially limited by the pressure
to settle. To the extent participation theorists insist upon meaningful
participation,' 51 the defendant's apparent right to participate in a frivolous
case whose economics favor early settlement is arguably no right at all. He
would be irrational to expend the resources necessary to vindicate that right.
If a stricter pleading standard mitigates defendants' potentially perverse but
rational incentives to settle certain frivolous claims, that standard also
vindicates participation as an independent value. Thus, if we are genuinely
concerned about participation for both sides to a dispute, balancing
economic incentives serves that goal as well.
Because this Article approaches the pleading problem from a law and
economics perspective, the prescriptive analysis that follows is framed in
largely consequentialist terms. That is, the economic model and the
prescriptions derived therefrom embrace a standard law and economics-
influenced theory of procedural justice in which preference is given to
minimizing net social costs on utilitarian grounds. But the step from
utilitarian balancing to a preference for substantive accuracy is a small one,
since the general upshot of the prescriptive approach is to limit defendant's
incentives to settle frivolous claims. Somewhat less obviously, the
consequentialist analysis also indirectly implies superior participation on
the part of litigants, once we accept the notion that "meaningful
participation" works both ways, and that defendants are also entitled to
something more than a nominal right to appear in court.
B. Existing Pleading Literature
Before tackling the pleading problem prescriptively, a brief review of
the existing doctrinal and economic literature is also in order.
Until recently, the scholarly literature on pleading standards was
remarkably thin, with only a few significant pieces written from the 1930s
through the early 2000s. Widespread scholarly interest in pleading is a
remarkably recent phenomenon, tracing its birth to the Supreme Court's
5
o See infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
15 1See Solum, supra note 139, at 25-60.
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2007 opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 152 The source of renewed
academic interest in pleading is obvious: In Twombly, the Supreme Court
apparently puts a sacred cow out to pasture, describing key language from
the Court's seminal pleading opinion as having "earned its retirement."
1
'
3
But, before Twombly, the literature was thin indeed.
In the 1920s and 1930s, Yale Professor and Dean (and later Judge)
Charles Clark wrote a series of influential articles that effectively laid the
groundwork for the national transition from "code" or "fact" pleading 54 to
notice pleading.1 55  Clark is correctly hailed as the chief architect and
proponent of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and his then-
radical approach to pleading was intended to be the cornerstone of the
Federal Rules' approach to civil litigation. 
156
Taken together, Clark's voluminous pre-Rules writings on pleading
standards are a scathing indictment of the then-current state of pleading law.
Clark largely adopted the conventional wisdom that by the time of the Field
Code's adoption in 1848, traditional common law pleading had become "an
abstruse and involved science, based upon such technicalities that the
movement for the so-called reformed or code pleading necessarily
followed.1 57 But in Clark's view, the "fact pleading" solution proffered by
the Field Code and its progeny ultimately proved only a marginal
improvement, evolving over time to require increasingly detailed filings,
and resulting in the same risk attendant with common law pleading: that
justice might be denied by complex, confusing, overly technical and
sometimes unpredictable pleading requirements. 158
Clark's criticism of the status quo eventually evolved into a broad
endorsement of notice pleading, a concept codified in the "short and plain
'"2127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
1531Id. at 1669.
154 Several states had retained common law pleading as well.
'55CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON MODERN PLEADING (West Pub. Co., rev. ed.) (1952).
156 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L.
REv. 1749 (1998) [hereinafter Marcus, Pleading Practice].
157Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REV. 272, 275 (1941). Clark did note,
however, that the complexity and technicality of common law pleading was only part of the story.
In Clark's retelling, the common law pleading system remained simple and direct for many
categories of claims, but was brought into disrepute by lawyers' pleading practices in other case
types. See id.
158 See id. at 277 (decrying the risk of dismissal because of a "lawyer's mistake, induced
perhaps by technical ignorance or even by lack of clarity of the decisions").
[Vol. 61: 1
BALANCING THE PLEADING EQUATION
statement" phrasing of Rule 8(a)(2). 159  Ultimately, Clark's vision of
pleading achieved near-universal acceptance among both courts and
commentators. With very few exceptions, pre-Twombly scholarly follow-
ups to Clark's work were broadly sympathetic to his view of pleading
standards; the handful of significant post-Clark articles mostly criticized
perceived statutory or common law shifts away from notice pleading after
the adoption of the Federal Rules. 1
60
Twombly has rekindled scholarly interest in pleading standards.
161
Though the occasional commentator supports all or part of Twombly's
apparent retreat from the broadest possible conception of notice pleading,
162
the thrust of most post-Twombly articles has largely been the same: notice
pleading is a fundamental characteristic of U.S. litigation, and the Court's
retreat in Twombly is indefensible.1
63
The existing doctrinal literature on pleading standards has roots in all
three of the broad "procedural justice" categories discussed above. By far
the most common normative justification proffered in support of a proposed
pleading standard is that it will yield more accurate results than the
alternative. Given the plaintiff-centric focus of most pleading scholarship,
this accuracy preference is typically expressed in terms of the risks
159FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The first significant scholarly endorsement of notice pleading
appears to have been published in 1918, shortly before Clark began his serious writing on the
subject. See generally Clarke B. Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1918).
160See generally, e.g., Fairman, supra note 1 (criticizing judicial and congressional imposition
of heightened pleading standards on both "original intent" and "participation" grounds); Fairman,
Notice Pleading, supra note 7 (suggesting that transsubstantive notice pleading is a "myth" and
implicitly criticizing departures from notice pleading as historically and normatively flawed);
Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986) [hereinafter Marcus, Fact Pleading] (criticizing courts' revival of fact
pleading standards and suggesting increased role for summary judgment rather than stricter
pleading standards); Marcus, Pleading Practice, supra note 156 (concluding that then-recent
statutory and common-law developments did not justify departure from notice pleading approach).
161 See generally sources cited supra note 97.
162See generally, e.g., Max Huff-man, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust
Conspiracy Claims, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 627 (2008); EPSTEIN, supra note 3.
163 See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 97, at 433 (describing Twombly as "an unwarranted
interpretation of Rule 8 that will frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with valid claims to get into
court"). See generally, e.g., Thomas, supra note 97 (concluding that Twombly is unconstitutional
under the Seventh Amendment, and suggesting that Twombly's result is undesirable on normative
grounds as well).
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associated with rejecting plaintiffs' potentially meritorious claims before
they have an opportunity to develop their cases.
Other scholars appear to adopt a "balancing" approach to the question.
For these scholars, pleading standards are part of a bigger cost-
minimization or value-maximization story. To date, most scholarship
adopting a balancing approach has concluded that any problems inherent in
a liberal pleading standard are best resolved at other points in the pretrial
process. 164 As we have seen, these conclusions are suspect at best.
Finally, some scholars seem at least implicitly to endorse a
"participation" theory of procedural justice, in which access to the courts
(again, primarily for plaintiffs) is seen as having value independent of its
effect on outcomes. 165 None of these perspectives is inherently incorrect.
But because the existing literature tends to focus on only the plaintiff's side
of the equation, these perspectives are incomplete.
There are essentially two problems with the existing doctrinal pleading
literature: First, it largely fails to consider the bilateral economic incentives
facing litigating parties. Second, to the limited extent the existing doctrinal
articles do attempt to engage with the "frivolous suit" problem, or with a
cost-balancing approach more generally, their defense of universally liberal
pleading standards typically relies upon solutions that are inherently
unworkable, sometimes for multiple reasons. 
166
The single most important consideration in crafting a pleading standard
is the extent to which expected pretrial cost disparity influences parties'
behavioral incentives. And because the problems associated with
significant cost disparities cannot readily be solved through improved case
management alone, 161 summary judgment proceedings,16 or post-resolution
sanctions regimes, 169 the pleading standard is effectively the only moving
part left to adjust.
'64 See generally, e.g., Marcus, Fact Pleading, supra note 160.
165 See generally, e.g., Fairman, Notice Pleading, supra note 7.
16 6 See supra notes 14-68 and accompanying text.
167See supra notes 1468 and accompany text. As discussed below, more effective case
management may be possible with a stricter pleading standard and the salience occasioned by the
early pleading standard hearing this Article proposes.
168Summary judgment comes too late, and without compensation for pretrial expenditures.
See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
169See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
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C. Economic Literature
A similarly thin literature assesses the economic impact of pleading
rules. Though scholars have developed a rich and complex economic
perspective on the issue of frivolous litigation generally, 170 they have
devoted remarkably little time to analyzing the critical role pleading
standards play in filtering claims. Indeed, there appear to be only two
significant preexisting economic analyses of pleading standards.
Professor Robert Bone devotes a full chapter to pleading standards in
his book analyzing the economics of civil procedure.17' But Bone's text is
designed as a general introduction to the economic analysis of procedural
problems. 172 Thus, his pleading standards analysis is primarily a stylized
pedagogical example demonstrating the economic tradeoffs inherent in
various procedural standards. Nonetheless, Bone's approach to the
pleading problem is helpful and instructive, if ultimately incomplete.
Bone builds his analysis atop the classic Rosenberg/Shavell ("R-S")
nuisance suit model. 73 Thus, though pretrial cost asymmetry is explicitly
considered, 174 Bone's conclusions are limited somewhat by the assumptions
in the R-S model. Bone's analysis focuses on the effects of two different
but largely undefined pleading standards-"notice pleading" and "strict
pleading"-upon the parties' incentives in frivolous lawsuits.' 75  Bone
explores these incentives in connection with three initial states of
information: (1) plaintiffs and defendants both know ex ante that the suit is
170 See supra note 104 and sources cited therein.
171 See BONE, supra note 9, at 125-57.
172 See, e.g., Thomson West Foundation Press Product Lines,
http://www.westacademic.com/Professors/FoundationPress/ProductLines.aspx?tab=2 (last visited
Dec. 24, 2008) (describing the "Turning Point" series of explanatory texts).
173 See BONE, supra note 9, at 45-50, 150-55 (following D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model
in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985)). This
Article's analysis is structurally similar to the Rosenberg/Shavell approach, save that it (1) models
external costs independently, and (2) makes different assumptions about payoffs at different
decision nodes, driven by the realities of U.S. pretrial practice.
174 See id. at 45.
175The term "frivolous" is notoriously difficult to define, as Bone and others acknowledge.
See, e.g., id. at 41-43 (acknowledging definition problem, and defining a frivolous suit as one that
either (1) is known by the plaintiff to be without substantive merit before filing, or (2) is filed by
plaintiff without her conducting reasonable pre-filing investigation that would have revealed
information sufficient to put the suit into Category 1).
20091
BAYLOR LAWREVIEW
frivolous, (2) plaintiff knows the suit is frivolous but defendant does not,
and (3) defendant knows the suit is frivolous but the plaintiff does not. 176
With respect to Category 1, relying upon R-S, Bone ultimately
concludes that because "answering is seldom more costly than filing, the
model predicts that few frivolous plaintiffs will find it worthwhile to
sue."'177 As discussed below, though Bone's conclusion logically follows
from the assumptions in the R-S model, it can in a few categories of cases
be quite incorrect. The process of answering even a known frivolous
lawsuit can be staggering in the real world of U.S. civil litigation, because
the U.S. litigation process does not provide defendants with exit points in
between pleading and post-discovery summary judgment. These costs are
not only significant in absolute terms, but can also be substantial relative to
the plaintiffs filing costs, especially for case types in which plaintiffs
expected pretrial expenditures are comparatively low. Thus, Bone's
conclusion that "few frivolous plaintiffs will find it worthwhile to sue"'
178
may be true across the great run of civil litigation, but for certain cases
involving significant pretrial cost disparity, even mutual foreknowledge of
frivolousness will be insufficient to deter filing. Moreover, when the
defendant's absolute costs of answering (better described as defendant's
pretrial costs-to-disposition) are large, inefficient settlements can be
correspondingly large as well. 1
79
In Bone's Category 2, the plaintiff knows ex ante that her claim is
frivolous, but the defendant does not. Bone acknowledges that this
category produces significant risk of frivolous filings, but rejects the
conclusion that pleading standards would affect the plaintiffs incentives.
180
According to Bone, the plaintiff "will simply fabricate the necessary
allegations," even under a strict pleading regime.'18 But Bone may have
ignored the potentially significant value of forcing plaintiffs to fabricate in
circumstances where cost disparity creates perverse incentives. In
'
76See id. at 150-55. Bone explicitly rejects consideration of the fourth possible state of
information, neither plaintiff nor defendant knows the claim is frivolous, but acknowledges that
"mutual ignorance also invites frivolous filings that can produce high costs in equilibrium." See
id. at 150 n.34.
177Id. at 150.
178 Id.
17 9The R-S model also fails to consider the impact of external costs of settlement upon
litigants; these costs have interesting implications for litigation decisions as well.
"'Id. at 151.
181id.
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particular, a stricter pleading standard will in turn decrease the defendant's
anticipated pretrial costs, because the discovery necessary to disprove more
concrete allegations will be less than that required to defeat notice-pled
allegations at summary judgment.
Finally, Bone considers situations in which the defendant knows that the
claim is frivolous, but the plaintiff does not. In these situations, Bone
concludes that a heightened pleading standard may be appropriate in such
cases when investigation costs are moderate. 182 Bone is correct to point out
the possible costs of a heightened standard as to these cases-some number
of ultimately meritorious suits will never be filed-but he does not consider
the hybrid pleading approach offered by this Article.
In sum, though Bone's basic approach is sound, the model upon which
he bases his conclusions departs from economic reality in ways that
significantly affect the parties' incentives. Moreover, Bone's simplified
approach fails to consider whether a change in pleading standard may in
fact affect the parties' expected costs of litigating to disposition, and thus
their game theoretical incentives. Also, Bone effectively assumes
transsubstantivity, basing his conclusion on the intuition that the small
category of cases for which he believes strict pleading would be superior do
not counterbalance the large category of cases for which notice pleading is
the better option.
Keith Hylton has recently added to the literature on pleading
economics. 183 But Hylton takes a significantly different approach to the
problem. Building to some extent upon the two-stage "frivolous suit"
model of Lucian Bebchuk,184 Hylton ultimately suggests what amounts to a
sliding scale pleading standard that should "vary with the evidentiary
demands of the associated legal standards and the social costs of
litigation." ' 85
Hylton's approach is effectively unilateral; he suggests that "the
threshold merit level [required to survive a motion to dismiss] should
increase as litigation becomes less productive as a deterrent and more costly
"Id. at 155.
183See generally Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of
Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 39 (2008).
18 4 See id. at 48-50; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the
Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996).
185 Hylton, supra note 183, at 62.
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to society."' 186 That is, Hylton's approach largely ignores the possibility that
civil litigation might effectively self-regulate as plaintiffs and defendants
look to their own expected litigation costs in addition to their opponents.
Instead, Hylton's prescription is based largely upon absolutes. He
recommends dismissal at the pleading stage for claims where the "claims
and evidence asserted at the pleading stage are insufficient to meet the merit
requirement at the summary judgment stage" and the "discovery-enhanced"
merit level (i.e., the merit of the claims after discovery) is not
"unambiguously greater than the summary judgment merit requirement."'' 87
In Hylton's model, the "summary judgment merit requirement"
increases as the social cost of litigation increases. 188  Hylton suggests
different pleading standards depending on the ratio of false convictions to
false acquittals and the total nominal costs of litigation to the parties and
society.189  So Hylton envisions a stricter pleading standard when "the
plaintiffs claims impose relatively high costs on the defendant."'
190
Hylton offers several concrete examples in defense of his proposed
standard. He first considers fraud claims as an example of claims for which
the underlying legal standard "imposes a heavy burden on plaintiffs."' 91 He
then justifies a stricter pleading standard for such claims on the grounds that
it will "ensure that a claim admitted into court was likely to meet the
evidentiary requirements of the legal standard" and "reduce the frequency
of socially wasteful litigation."'' 92  Similarly, Hylton suggests that fraud
claims carry high social costs, particularly in terms of damage to the
defendant's reputation and the disruption in commerce that would result if
contracts were subject to frivolous claims of fraud, and that these higher
social costs also justify stricter pleading standards. 193  Hylton offers a
similar analysis as to antitrust claims. 194
Hylton's two-stage, sliding scale approach is certainly worthy of further
study and consideration. But as a threshold matter, Hylton's decision not to
86Id. at 50.
'Id. at 51-52.
SSId. at 52.
18 91d.
190 d
9 1id. at 58.
192id.
193Id.
194 See id. at 59-63.
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incorporate a game theoretical analysis of the litigation process may
ultimately result in overtreatment of the disease. Specifically, for claim
types characterized by high net social costs but relative pretrial cost parity
between plaintiffs and defendants, a stricter pleading standard may be
unnecessary; the plaintiff in such cases has substantial incentive to file only
claims she reasonably believes have substantive merit. Addressing
Hylton's fraud example directly, if the plaintiffs expected pretrial costs
under a notice pleading regime are equal to or greater than defendant's,1 95
there is little risk that she will file a fraud claim without reasonable
expectation of success on the merits. We do not need a high pleading
burden to keep out frivolous or abusive claims in that situation.
Applying a game theory filter to the social cost problem more generally
yields a similar result. Though it is certainly true that "an allegation of
fraud could severely damage a business,"'196 a game theoretical approach
suggests that defendants would be unwilling to incur these costs as to
frivolous claims. When there is relative cost parity among plaintiff and
defendant, the defendant has a strong incentive to pursue frivolous claims to
disposition in order to protect that reputation. Because the plaintiff would
be aware that the defendant's threat to litigate is credible, she would be
deterred from filing such claims in the first place. The same is true to some
extent with respect to "disruption in commerce" costs as well.' 97 Finally, a
sliding scale standard of the sort Hylton proposes may be difficult to
implement in practice, as courts struggle to generate consistency and
predictability in a world of nearly infinite variation.
In sum, though the existing economic literature on pleading standards
advances the ball, it fails to fully consider the impact of bilateral economic
incentives on the parties' litigation decisions.
195 See supra Part IV.C.2.
196 Hylton, supra note 183, at 58.
'
97 Id. Defendants may not always have an incentive to internalize fully the "disruption in
commerce" costs Hylton identifies. That category of costs may be subject to greater or lesser
collective action problems, depending upon the impact a single suit would have upon the
defendant's perception of its ability to contract in the future.
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D. Prescribing Balance
1. Reimagining Transsubstantivity
If the model accurately captures the essence of pretrial economics, its
implications are clear: a unitary transsubstantive pleading standard may do
more harm than good. To the extent there exist some cases or claim types
for which pretrial costs are typically balanced or favor the defendant, the
model demonstrates that the pleading standard should err on the side of
correcting informational asymmetries. For those claim types, the risk of
strike suit is minimal, and thus the pleading standard can and should
legitimately focus upon correcting plaintiffs presumed knowledge deficit.
Notice pleading often works.
The calculus is vastly different when there is substantial pretrial cost
disparity favoring the plaintiff. For those claim types, the risk of cost
arbitrage is real, thus suggesting that a stricter pleading standard may be
appropriate. But those claims are also likely to carry a concomitantly
higher risk of Type II error; claims involving higher discovery costs for
defendants are generally claims in which defendants control more of the
relevant information, so the risk of erroneous dismissal is higher for these
claims as well.
Given the challenges associated with designing a pleading standard for
high-risk claims, and given the relatively straightforward analysis of low-
risk claims, it may be preferable to use cost disparity as a dividing line, and
to apply different default pleading standards on each side of the divide. The
economics of pleading suggest that most garden-variety civil claims should
be subject to traditional notice pleading, but that high-risk claims are better
addressed through a stricter default pleading standard.
Given the fractured reality of our modem transsubstantive approach, a
bifurcated standard based upon cost-disparity criteria may actually satisfy
the goals of transsubstantivity more effectively than existing pleading
regimes. The analysis of this Article ultimately implies replacing claim
specific pleading standard enhancement (e.g., securities fraud claims) with a
truly universal standard that diverges only on the basis of cost and not claim
type.
2. Notice Pleading for Low-Risk Claims
Traditional notice pleading is more than adequate for the majority of
existing claim types. Any category of claims that is not likely to engender
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substantial cost disparities favoring plaintiffs is unlikely to invite inefficient
claims and settlements. With concerns about cost asymmetries irrelevant,
the only remaining concern as to these claims is the possible informational
asymmetry favoring defendants in most cases.
Notice pleading is well-suited to address this asymmetry. Traditional
notice pleading requires only that the plaintiff provide the defendant notice
of the transactions, occurrences, or events that constitute the wrong, and
that the plaintiff state what she wants from the lawsuit. This liberal
standard, while potentially problematic for claims subject to a high risk of
frivolous suit, allows plaintiffs to proceed in low risk suits even without
knowing all of the details of their claims. Thus, for the great majority of
existing claims, the economic analysis of pleading standards suggests that
no change is necessary.
3. Strict Pleading for High-Risk Claims
By contrast, a notice pleading standard may not be preferable for high-
risk claims. As the name implies, notice pleading requires only that the
plaintiff give the defendant sufficient notice of her claim to allow the
defendant to prepare a defense. Under a notice pleading regime, pretrial
cost disparity will likely be at its highest, because notice pleading does not
require the plaintiff to allege details around which the court can sequence or
limit discovery.
To mitigate Type I risk, it would be economically preferable if the
default rule required the plaintiff to allege facts tending to support each
element of her claim. This stricter pleading standard need not and should
not be overly formal; Twombly's plausibility requirement may suffice. 198
But formal or informal, strict pleading is superior to notice pleading in
high-risk situations along a number of dimensions.
198 In context, Twombly effectively revives fact pleading, at least as to antitrust conspiracy
claims. The factual practices alleged by the plaintiffs would have been illegal if agreed to among
the defendants, thus if the plaintiffs had alleged "plausible" facts as to the existence of an
agreement, they would have alleged facts in support of every element of a claim. Fact pleading is
an all-or-nothing proposition; fact pleading is effectively meaningless without requiring facts
supporting every element. See infra notes 231-45 and accompanying text for further discussion of
the possible contours of a stricter standard.
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a. Strict Pleading Lowers Three Forms of Social Cost
i. Inefficient Filing and Settlement: The Type I Problem
Strict pleading has obvious economic advantages over notice pleading.
At its most basic level, by requiring the plaintiff to provide more detail,
strict pleading can shrink defendant's expected internal costs of litigation
substantially.'99 If a claim otherwise susceptible to cost arbitrage risk
satisfies a stricter pleading standard, the additional details in the pleading
will become the focal point of factual inquiry in the case. Compared to
notice pleading, the specificity of stricter pleading will help courts
overcome their own rational ignorance. 200  By focusing on the facts that
make plaintiffs allegation plausible, the court can sequence much of the
expected cost to defendants such that truly frivolous claims will be subject
to summary judgment at substantially lower cost. 201
All of this in turn reduces the problematic disparity between the
plaintiffs expected litigation costs and the defendant's expected litigation
costs. Because the risk of Type I error is directly related to the difference
between plaintiffs expected costs and defendant's, decreasing defendant's
expected costs of litigation in turn reduces the risk of pretrial cost arbitrage.
The lower defendant's expected pretrial litigation costs, the less potential
plaintiffs will be interested in filing strike suits.
20 2
ii. Administrative and Other Social Costs Also Decrease
Strict pleading also likely decreases other social costs traditionally
associated with litigation. Under strict pleading, some lower number of
cases will be brought, and fewer cases will survive the pleading stage.
Thus, one would expect the deadweight administrative costs of civil
litigation--costs associated with running the courts-to be lower under
199 In cases with substantial Type I risk, defendants are likely to be quite motivated to seek
judicial intervention. When the relevant facts supporting the claim are clearly alleged, several of
the traditional precipitants ofjudicial disengagement are less likely to factor in.
2
M°Cf Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 638, 644-45 (noting that with a return to fact pleading,
judicial management of pretrial costs becomes more plausible).
201 See Hylton, supra note 183, at 51-52 (arguing for symmetry between dismissal and
summary judgment standards).
202A stricter, fact-driven pleading standard for such claims will provide the court with the
ability to conduct meaningful case management; the bifurcated regime envisioned by this Article,
complete with a cost/bond hearing if necessary, will provide opportunity and incentive.
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strict pleading than under notice pleading. As important, the cases that
survive a relatively more rigorous pleading standard are likely to be less
expensive to develop and try in absolute terms, especially for defendants.
Strict pleading limits the overall systemic cost of litigation.
4. Wrongful Dismissals: The Type II Problem
Compared to notice pleading, strict pleading should be superior along at
least three cost dimensions for high-risk claims: Type I error costs,
administrative costs of the litigation system, and direct litigation costs for
cases passing the pleading bar all should be lower than if notice pleading
were the standard. The critical question, then, is whether the benefits of
strict pleading are associated with an increase in Type II error costs.
Any tightening of the pleading standard carries with it the risk of
additional Type II error. If any chance exists that an apparently frivolous
pleading-that is, a claim with no obvious objective factual support
apparent at the pleading stage-may nonetheless turn out to be valid, then a
move from notice pleading to strict pleading carries with it some additional
risk of Type II error.
It is extremely difficult to measure relative error rates; in fact, the model
predicts settlement of even wholly frivolous cases when cost conditions are
right, so the fact of settlement in earlier cases is of no value in assessing the
viability of underlying claims. °3  And in the absence of a natural
experiment, change in relative error rates occasioned by a shift in pleading
standards is particularly difficult to measure or predict.2 4 Because
measurement of error rates is so difficult, this Article suggests a solution
designed to limit Type II error risk when good-faith plaintiffs otherwise
would be unable to meet heightened strict pleading requirements in high
cost disparity (and thus high-risk) contexts.
203 If settlement amounts were made public, there might be some potential for quantitative
analysis, but strike suits do not necessarily encourage settlements in which settlement amounts are
disclosed publicly. See generally Scott A. Moss, lluhminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis
of Confidential Settlements 105 MICH. L. REv. 867 (2007).
204One long-term advantage of the bond requirement proposed below may be the
accumulation of data regarding Type II error rates in high-risk cases. Since the defendant's
incentive to settle on cost-of-defense grounds alone is eliminated, summary judgment rates,
settlement rates, and verdicts would provide meaningful data as to the actual incidence of Type II
risk.
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a. Balancing the Equation: A Bond Requirement
There will be some ultimately meritorious high-risk claims for which
plaintiffs cannot initially satisfy a heightened fact pleading standard.
Viewed ex ante from the plaintiffs perspective, such claims are essentially
a matter of luck, subjective belief, or probability. If the plaintiff cannot
plead plausible details, the fact that the claim ultimately has value may be
wholly fortuitous. Alternatively, the plaintiff may genuinely believe her
claim has a positive expected value, but that belief may be based upon
subjective criteria that cannot be articulated in terms of the plausibility facts
supporting the claim. Finally, despite the absence of plausible factual
knowledge, plaintiff may nonetheless rationally believe her claim has value
on the basis of population compliance data.205
Consider the plaintiffs thought process in the latter context: "In my
experience or according to reliable sources, some percentage X of all
similarly situated defendants are guilty, causing damages of $Y. Though I
have no objective or subjective reason to believe this particular defendant is
guilty, it is nonetheless rational to file suit because my expected value of
filing suit is X times $ Y, which exceeds my expected costs of litigation $Z."
To the extent we are concerned that any dismissal or failure to file will
be unacceptably common with the adoption of strict pleading in high-risk
contexts, those risks can be ameliorated by allowing plaintiffs to opt out of
the strict pleading requirement by posting a bond to be forfeited to the
defendant in the event the claim was without merit. The following sections
detail the theoretical underpinnings of a bond requirement and offer
thoughts on real-world implementation of the scheme.
i. Economics of the Bond Requirement
Acceptance of notice pleading to mitigate Type II error risk carries with
it a substantially increased risk of Type I error in the form of cost arbitrage
suits. The model presented in Part IV predicts that the risk of inefficient
settlements increases as the disparity of defendant's pretrial costs (offset by
settlement externalities) to plaintiffs pretrial costs increases.0 6  If the
equation can be balanced in favor of the defendant, the risk of cost arbitrage
decreases.
205 Here, "population compliance" refers to aggregate rates of compliance and noncompliance
with legal duties among similarly situated parties.
206See supra discussion at Part IV.
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A risk-neutral plaintiff with a genuine but wholly subjective or
probabilistic belief that her claim has a positive expected value should be
willing to opt out of strict pleading standards (which she cannot, by
definition, satisfy) by posting a bond in order to proceed through discovery
on a notice pleading standard. 0 7 In order to accomplish its goals, the bond
would first need to be large enough to overcome any disparity between
defendant's expected pretrial disposition costs for a frivolous suit and
plaintiffs expected pretrial disposition costs for the same claim. In
addition, upon dismissal or rejection of the plaintiffs claim-preferably at
summary judgment or before-the bond should be surrendered to the
defendant rather than to the court. If the defendant knows ex ante that he
will receive the bond amount at disposition of a frivolous claim, he would
no longer have an incentive to settle instead of litigating to disposition.
Thus, the theoretically optimum bond would equal the difference between
the plaintiffs expected costs of litigation on one hand and the defendant's
expected pretrial costs less his external costs of settlement on the other. Put
another way, the bond should be equal to the expected strike suit settlement
value of a frivolous claim.
In our hypothetical case between risk-neutral Peggy and risk-neutral
Donald, Peggy's pretrial costs are $5, Donald's pretrial costs are $12, and
Donald's external costs of settlement are $3. Without the bond, Donald's
settlement indifference value is $9 and the case ultimately settles for $4. If
Peggy were required to post a bond in the amount of $4 to proceed under a
notice standard, pleading, she would have no incentive to bring the claim
unless her expected value of claim was probabilistically positive. For a
wholly frivolous claim with a $4 bond posted, Donald would be indifferent
between proceeding to disposition, where his net costs would be $8 ($12 in
costs, partially offset by a $4 bond payment) and settlement of $5 (where
his total costs would also be $8: $5 in settlement plus $3 in externalities).
Because Donald could then counterbalance the full amount of his
indifference value by imposing $5 in pretrial costs upon Peggy, Peggy
would have no ex ante incentive to bring the claim absent good-faith belief
in its substantive merit.
207 Risk-neutral in this context means that the plaintiff is indifferent between any particular
actual payout and a probabilistic payout of the same expected value. Thus, a risk-neutral lottery
participant would be indifferent between receiving a certain $1 cash payout and a chance to win
$1,000,000 with 0.000001 a probability. Risk-seeking plaintiffs (those willing to trade a certain
payout for a lower probabilistic payout) may be willing to post bonds even when they have no
subjective or objective reason to believe their claim has merit.
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ii. Practical Challenges and Solutions
Within the model, the bond requirement solves the Type I problem by
completely eliminating a plaintiffs incentives to arbitrage the difference
between its own expected litigation costs and the defendant's. But the
model and the real world diverge in several potentially important ways;
real-world implementation of a bond requirement must address those
differences and the challenges they create.
The challenges associated with implementation of a bond solution fall
into three categories: expectation, calculation, and location. In the real-
world, the parties may have different beliefs as to their own expected costs
and the expected costs of their adversaries. Even if this challenge can be
overcome, it may be quite difficult to calculate expected costs ex ante such
that the bond amount is set at an appropriate level. And finally, significant
practical challenges are associated with the location of the bond forfeiture
itself: at what point and under what conditions should the defendant be
entitled to recover?
iii. Differing Expectations
In the real world, litigating parties do not often share identical ex ante
perceptions as to their own expected costs or their adversaries' expected
costs. In our scaled-down hypothetical world, for example, a defendant
may expect to spend $10 defending a claim through summary judgment,
while the plaintiff believes that the defendant will spend only $7. Differing
real-world expectations can play havoc with the efficient resolution of
claims. If the model itself were adapted to allow differing expectations
without simultaneously permitting iterative settlement negotiations, those
differing expectations regarding the parties' pretrial litigation costs could
ultimately derail settlement entirely.20
8
One real-world mechanism for addressing this concern would instead
address the difference in expectations. There is, presumably, a "right
answer" to the pretrial costs question; at the end of discovery, both plaintiff
and defendant will have expended certain sums on the litigation. Thus, it
might be possible to mitigate the effects of expectation differences by
bringing the parties' expectations closer together. Perhaps a judicial
20
' For example, consider the situation in which the plaintiffs estimate of defendant's pretrial
costs is higher than defendant's own estimate. If the model allows only for a single settlement
offer from plaintiff, the offer will be too high for defendant to accept.
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determination of expected costs after hearing would be sufficient; even if it
fails to align the parties' expectations perfectly in real life, it is likely to
bring them closer together, and may in any event offer a useful fiction for
the purposes of establishing a bond amount.
20 9
iv. Difficult Calculations
Assuming the parties' differing expectations ultimately can be
harmonized, it still may be difficult to calculate the appropriate bond
amount. A court tasked with determining the relevant cost disparity is quite
likely to face claims of high cost from both plaintiffs and defendants. The
plaintiff has an incentive to overstate her expected costs because this will
decrease the ex ante disparity upon which the bond is based; the defendant
faces incentives to overstate costs because it increases that disparity and
thus the bond. In addition, pretrial costs are often difficult to estimate ex
ante even when the parties are acting in complete good faith.
The most attractive solution to the calculation problem may be to put the
adversary system to work. By requiring the parties to litigate the issue of
pretrial costs before a judge or magistrate, evidence relevant to expected
costs can be brought to light and tested. The evidence most relevant to this
determination would be cost data for similar previous cases. Though there
is certainly reason to believe that the litigants would reach for the outer
limits in arguing that their current case will be costly to litigate, data on past
cases may be surprisingly reliable. In any litigated case, the defense
attorneys' incentives to maximize fees are counterbalanced by their long-
term desire to obtain and retain clients; excessive defense costs over time
tend to lose clients and decrease firm profits. Plaintiff's attorneys billing by
the hour are subject to similar pressures. In addition, plaintiffs attorneys
working on contingency fee face a slightly different set of competing
incentives. Though they may be interested in generating hours to improve
their attorneys' fees in "lodestar" cases, that incentive is counterbalanced by
the fact that they maximize their recovery and minimize their opportunity
costs by doing as little work as possible for any given level of return. Thus,
though the parties may stretch and push with respect to why their current
209 It is worth noting that the single-iteration binary settlement negotiation of the model does
not reflect real-world practice; to the extent the parties continue to differ as to cost expectations,
they may continue to negotiate and persuade. These ongoing negotiations and the concomitant
shifts in expectations can produce settlements when a single-iteration binary model suggests none
is possible; a judicial fact-finding exercise may prove an adequate substitute.
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case is different (behavior judges are fully competent to evaluate on the
merits in any event), data on earlier similar cases may be relatively
reliable.21
Calculation of cost disparities will be difficult and, to some degree,
inherently speculative. But an adversarial process backed by data from
previous cases should help the court arrive at a reasonable estimate, in
addition to helping the parties harmonize their own expectations regarding
the likely costs of litigation.
v. Case-by-Case or Claim Type?
Should the "fact pleading with an opt-out bond regime" be applied on a
case-by-case basis or by claim type? In a world without transaction costs,
case-by-case is best. Not all antitrust claims will present Type I risk, and a
claim type approach will necessarily involve some errors along the margins.
But transaction costs are a real and persistent feature of litigation, and it
will be far from costless to determine whether any specific individual claim
in fact raises cost arbitrage concerns. 21 1  Thus, it may be preferable to
develop a claim-type approach over time, under which the default
presumption is that notice pleading will apply, with specific high-risk claim
types subject to the heightened fact pleading standard.1 2 That said, as an
initial matter at least, it may be necessary to develop a body of judicial
knowledge through case-by-case analysis. And transaction costs can be
limited to some degree by providing defendants with economic disincentive
to invoke the higher pleading standard absent substantial cost disparity.
Finally, assuming it is possible to identify claims subject to fact
pleading and opt-out bond posting, when should the plaintiff forfeit her
bond? Any line we might draw will be potentially arbitrary on the margins,
210Taken to its logical extreme, it is unlikely that attorneys will attempt to increase their costs
systematically simply to be in a better position when a pleading bond issue arises.
211See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL. STUD. 257 (1974); see also Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 640-41.
2 12One alternative to rigid categorization would be analogous to antitrust law's per se/Rule of
Reason continuum. Using that framework, certain claim types would be presumptively subject to
fact pleading, others presumptively would not, and intermediate cases could get a "quick look" or
truncated pleading standard analysis. Intuitively, even this regime is likely to be expensive;
further research might explore whether the additional accuracy benefits would be worth the
transaction costs. Another option might be to create a rebuttable presumption of fact pleading,
affording the plaintiff an opportunity to explain why the pretrial cost disparity for a generally
high-risk claim would be insufficient to trigger frivolous pleading risks in her specific case.
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but as an initial matter, it may be preferable to designate summary judgment
as the forfeiture line. Thus, a plaintiff who has opted out of fact pleading
would surrender her bond to the defendant in the event that she dismissed
her claim before summary judgment, or lost her claim at summary
judgment. Viewed in the context of a complaint that is allowed to proceed
despite the absence of plausible factual allegations, summary judgment,
granted only if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact,"' 13 comes
closest to capturing what should be the triggering conduct: filing of a
frivolous claim.
2 14
E. The Bond Hearing
1. Practically
Moving from theory to practice is never easy. Before attempting to
flesh out either the contours of the bond hearing or the economic incentives
it would engender, it is worth addressing one significant question up front:
is a bond hearing of this sort practical? What indication do we have that the
process has real-world potential?
This question can be further subdivided into two additional questions.
First, is the solution proffered by this Article politically feasible? And
second, assuming it is adopted, can courts implement it effectively and
efficiently?
a. Political Feasibility
Though no significant change to well-established (and largely
transsubstantive) procedural rules will come without tension and debate,
there is reason to believe that the dual-standard approach this Article
proposes is politically feasible. First and foremost, the time is ripe for such
a change. The upheaval caused by Twombly and the credible arguments on
either side of its purported plausibility requirement bespeak an environment
in which a compromise might be possible. 2 5 As discussed above, the bond
hearing opt-out offers the best of both worlds, especially when compared
2 13See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
214 This is not to suggest that any similar consequence is appropriate when a properly pleaded
claim is nonetheless dismissed at the summary judgment stage.
215 See generally Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
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against a "universal Twombly" alternative under which pleading standards
for certain case types are tightened without an opt-out opportunity.
Second, there exists a well-traveled path for reformers to follow in the
amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules are
relatively easily amended, and the notoriously ambiguous pleading standard
in Rule 8(a)(2) has already long existed side-by-side with the heightened
pleading standards set forth in Rule 9.216 Rules recognition of a cost
disparity-driven standard split is not an unthinkable departure. Moreover, it
is possible that the amended standard could in fact replace the oft-criticized
heightened pleading standard in Rule 9; an effective cost disparity-driven
rule would largely supplant the need for claim-specific pleading
standards.217
Third, though it may be beyond the power of the Supreme Court to
mandate a bond hearing without formal rulemaking, the quasi-common law
status of the pleading standard is virtually unique among the Federal Rules,
which strive for clarity over flexibility as to most other rules. Thus, it
seems that the Court could at the very least mandate a heightened pleading
standard for high cost disparity cases following in the general vein of cases
like Twombly. To the extent the Court is called upon to do so in the near
future, any resultant standard split is likely to encourage a response from
Congress or the Rules Committee.
b. Implementation
Though there are several potential challenges inherent in any attempt to
implement a bifurcated standard with a bond hearing proposal, courts have
sufficient resources and institutional experience to perform the task. Courts
perform similar tasks in connection with a variety of matters. For example,
Rule 65 allows courts to issue preliminary injunctions or temporary
restraining orders only if the moving party provides "security in an amount
that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by
any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained., 218 Thus,
every preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order hearing
necessarily should involve a structurally similar argument regarding the
2 16See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); id. 9.
2 17 This goes for the statutory heightened pleading requirements in the PSLRA, certain civil
rights cases, etc. as well.
218 FED. R. CIv. P. 65.
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value of the provisional relief sought.219 Civil courts also require bonds in
other contexts, including appeals. In addition, although the reality of Rule
11 practice suggests that Rule 11 is a bad candidate to solve the pleading
problem, 220 Rule 1 1 hearings have a similar character; the judge may
impose sanctions, but they are "limited to what suffices to deter repetition
of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. 221
Thus, though courts have not often applied Rule 11 to deter misconduct
systemically by balancing economic incentives, they have already been
given the explicit authority to do so; the bond hearing would simply move
up the determination to a point in the litigation where it is likely to have
actual effect upon the parties' ex ante cost expectations.
Moreover, the specific types of information the courts must consider in
a bond hearing are already well within their institutional competence to
assess. For the last dozen years or more, courts have examined and passed
judgment on similar information in the context of discovery dispute
hearings, especially those concerning the collection, review, and production
of electronically stored information. 22  For reasons discussed at length
above, mere case management without a shift in pleading standards is
unlikely to curb abuses in high cost disparity situations.223 But courts are
increasingly tasked with examining and evaluating the parties' expected
expense claims in civil litigation.
Finally, the proposed structure of the bond hearing and the case-specific
and longitudinal incentives of the parties will likely substantially mitigate
the most serious challenges associated with the bond hearing process. The
proposal does not solve every potential problem (nor does it wholly
eliminate the risk of cost disparity-driven opportunistic pleading), but it
219 Courts admittedly have not been overly consistent in their application of Rule 65(c). See
generally, e.g., Note, Recovery for Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c), 99
HARV. L. REv. 828 (1986).
22 0See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
221 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(4).
222 See generally Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 231 F.R.D. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 230 F.R.D.
290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
223 See supra notes 14-68 and accompanying text.
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does offer a useful starting point for crafting a workable solution to the
pleading problem.
2. Procedure
What, then, would the bond hearing look like? This inquiry has two
distinct components. First, we must consider the general contours of the
process. What are the primary waypoints along the way to case disposition,
and how should the flow of the case be structured? Second, we must
consider the practical specifics of the process. How will the court take and
consider evidence? How much cost disparity is enough? How do we
define "strict pleading" for those rare cases in which it becomes the default
assumption? I take each component in turn.
a. General Contours of The Process
To get a handle on the process, we must go back to the very beginning
of a hypothetical litigated case. The flow chart below offers a possible
implementation of the cost disparity paradigm:
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Several key features of this proposed process bear further discussion.
First, the process assumes that the plaintiffs initial pleading satisfies the
minimal notice pleading requirements under, for example, a traditional
interpretation of Conley.224 Second, in order to mitigate the risk that the
defendant will play his own cost imposition games, the process envisions a
sort of nondiscretionary unilateral English Rule for hearing costs associated
with determining the appropriate pleading standard. For most commonly
litigated case types, traditional pleading practice satisfies not only the
minimal requirements of notice pleading, but also whatever heightened
requirement we might choose to impose for high cost disparity claims. If
the defendant challenges a pleading that satisfies the heightened
requirement, he should be required to pay the plaintiffs costs of defending
that pleading.225
Similarly, if after hearing the court determines that the defendant has
failed to meet the requisite cost disparity threshold, then the defendant
would again be required to pay the plaintiffs (substantially higher) costs
associated with the evidentiary hearing. This is in some ways a draconian
rule, and one that may in fact deter defendants from challenging the
sufficiency of pleadings in all but the most significant cases of disparity.
But given the Type II risk associated with heightened pleading standards, a
default rule of this sort seems an appropriate starting point for system
design purposes.
b. Specific Considerations
i. How much Disparity, and Measuring External Costs
No matter how elegant the economic model, real-world implementation
is necessarily going to be imprecise. This is particularly true where, as
here, the court must estimate the parties' future costs in order to make its
decision. 226 Moreover, the bond hearing suggested by this Article's model
224 See generally Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
22 5 One possible exception to this requirement might allow defendants to avoid payment of
hearing costs if the court chooses to manage discovery actively to limit cost disparity that would
otherwise exist. Though it may be difficult for a court to manage discovery effectively in the
absence of actual detail in the pleading, it is possible that for some claim types, the court would be
able to act, once the defendant has brought the cost disparity to the court's attention.
226Nonetheless, we routinely ask courts and juries to predict the future in connection with
damages awards and electronic discovery disputes, to name two examples.
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raises two additional complicating questions: (1) how much cost disparity
should trigger a bond requirement, and (2) can we or should we attempt to
estimate external costs?
At the level of pure economic incentives, the model suggests that any
net difference in expected pretrial costs favoring plaintiff in turn creates an
incentive for opportunistic pleading.227 Thus, one possible approach would
require the court to impose a nondiscretionary bond in the amount of any
demonstrated cost disparity under notice pleading. But there are several
potential practical problems with such an approach.
First and foremost, given our longstanding commitment to liberal court
access and the admittedly imprecise nature of the cost disparity analysis, a
strict "any difference" policy could chill potentially useful litigation
activity. In addition, at the very least, it would be inefficient to encourage
parties to litigate the pleading standard when that determination would itself
cost more than the bond arising out of it.
These factors suggest that courts should not impose a bond requirement
unless the cost disparity analysis suggests a substantial incentive for
plaintiffs to behave opportunistically. In other words, the bond should only
be triggered if the disparity is greater than some substantial threshold
amount. Note that this is not the same as asking judges to pass on whether
the particular plaintiff in question seems to be behaving opportunistically.
Rather, the analysis is economic only, and looks to the incentives
engendered by the parties' cost expectations alone.
At this early juncture, it is difficult if not impossible to identify any
relative or absolute cost disparity threshold that should trigger a bond
requirement. But a few guidelines may be helpful in framing future debate
on this issue.
First, the disparity should be great enough that any concern regarding
the binary determination (whether cost disparity exists in the problematic
direction) is minimized. Though the court will not be certain that its
calculations are perfectly accurate, the disparity should be big enough that
the court is convinced that some incentive-affecting disparity exists.
Second, the disparity needs to be large enough to offset any concerns
regarding the impact that the parties' external costs might have on the
calculation. Unfortunately, real-world judges likely cannot rely upon the
parties to provide accurate, good-faith ex ante estimates of the external
costs associated with filing or settlement of a claim. Nor can the court
227 See supra discussion at Part IV.
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assess these costs accurately and precisely on its own. First, though
external filing and settlement costs are real, and though parties and their
lawyers spend significant time thinking about them as they plan litigation
strategy, they are extremely difficult to quantify. More important, the
parties do not face any obvious incentives to tell the truth to the court when
presenting their evidence of external costs, and the traditional adversarial
crucible is unlikely to yield a significantly refined product. As discussed
above, litigating parties do face incentives that encourage truth-telling with
respect to their expected internal pretrial costs. 22 8  A variety of factors
combine to suggest that parties will not routinely overstate their expected
attorneys' fees or other "hard" litigation expenditures to a significant
degree.
The same cannot be said for the parties' external costs. External costs
are inherently indeterminate; the fact that they are not readily susceptible to
either ex ante or ex post public calculation provides the parties with an
opportunity to misstate their expected external costs in court proceedings.
Defendants, for example, face a substantial incentive to understate their
expected external costs. To the extent they can persuade a court that early
settlement of the litigation in question is not likely to have follow-on
consequences (in the form of copycat litigation, reputational harm, etc.),
this increases the cost disparity modeled above, and thus increases the
court's perceived strike settlement value.
The plaintiffs incentives point in the opposite direction, and with an
added twist. A plaintiff seeking to minimize or eliminate a bond
requirement would like to persuade the court that she will suffer substantial
external consequences if she files a frivolous suit. 229 If the plaintiff could
extract, for example, a $1 million settlement from a defendant but would
suffer $2 million in external costs as a result, then filing a frivolous claim
would not be worth it. Thus, the plaintiffs incentive is to overstate her
external consequences of filing.
Moreover, the plaintiffs "external costs" story is at once both simpler
and more complicated than that. In the typical case, a plaintiff will not
228 See supra note 2 10 and accompanying text.
229 Note that the external consequences to the plaintiff from filing a frivolous suit are likely to
be zero or close to zero. If she successfully extracts a settlement from the defendant, regardless of
the underlying substantive merit of the claim, judges will remain rationally ignorant of the reasons
for the settlement, and there will be little or no information available from which others might
assess the merits of the claim.
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suffer any significant external consequences if she successfully extracts a
settlement from a defendant. Even the most conscientious judge will
remain rationally ignorant of the reasons for a settlement; it is not unlikely
that a judge who initially saw a complaint as borderline or likely frivolous
would change her mind when the parties settle. At the very least, settlement
would tend to encourage judicial (and broader public) agnosticism as to the
claim's underlying merits. Thus, though the model appropriately
incorporates the plaintiffs external costs, those costs are likely to be quite
low if all of the other economic incentives hold, and the defendant chooses
to settle rather than litigate to disposition.230
For this reason, any early attempt to implement a cost disparity-driven
pleading regime should probably not attempt to quantify the parties'
external costs. It is safer by far to insist instead that the internal cost
disparity be sufficiently large to offset the likely external consequences of
filing and settlement (most of which will be borne by the defendant).
Though precise quantification of external costs is neither advisable nor even
possible, a competent judge should be able to estimate likely external costs
sufficient to determine whether the internal cost disparities overwhelm
external cost effects.
Finally, the disparity should be large enough to make the bond hearing
process worthwhile. The bond hearing process will not be costless. Both
parties will expend resources preparing for and participating in the hearing,
and the court will invest its own resources as well. Thus, from a social cost
standpoint, it would make very little sense to allow a bond hearing if net
social welfare would actually be greater without one. At the same time, the
economic model suggests that defendants will have no incentive to seek a
bond hearing if it will cost them more than would a settlement resulting
from cost disparity. If a defendant would be willing to settle plaintiffs
claim for $50,000, then it would make no economic sense for him to pursue
a bond hearing that would cost him more than that.
But what about a scenario in which defendant's bond hearing costs
would be less than his expected settlement costs or the bond amount, but
aggregate hearing costs (all economic deadweight loss) would exceed the
bond amount?
230A future extension of the model might incorporate the plaintiffs probability-adjusted
expected external costs, accounting for differing expectations between the parties as to expected
pretrial costs.
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ii. Setting the Bond
No magic formula exists for setting the bond amount in the real world.
As discussed above, the calculation process is inherently imprecise, even as
to the parties' internal litigation cost estimates; moreover, it may not be
possible for a court to incorporate external cost terms into its analysis.
Given that, how can the bond hearing be of any use at all?
Actually, the cost estimation process embodied in the bond hearing is
enormously valuable, because it provides an anchoring point around which
the court can craft an appropriate bond. By exploring cost disparity in a
deliberate, systematic way, the bond hearing will provide a salient range
within which the judge can exercise her discretion without being overly
influenced by sympathy, emotion, or other factors irrelevant to the bond
determination.
As discussed above, Rule 11 sanctions hearings provide a useful and
humbling object lesson in the value of a bond hearing.231 Despite Rule I I's
explicit authorization of sanctions in an amount necessary to deter conduct
among similarly situated parties in the future, courts rarely if ever impose
sanctions for frivolous suits that in fact fully counteract the economic
incentives giving rise to frivolous claims.232 In fact, sanctions in even the
hundreds of thousands of dollars are virtually unheard of. But the
economics of pleading suggest that occasionally a bond in the millions of
dollars may be necessary to ensure good-faith in a notice pleading
environment.
Courts will not be able to estimate the bond amount with the economic
precision implied by the model. But the bond hearing will help to ensure
that the bond is in the right ballpark, and that it will have some actual effect
upon the parties' litigation incentives and behavior. 33
3. The Heightened Standard
Judge Clark certainly did not anticipate the cost disparity problem
identified in this Article. That said, he was unassailably correct about one
thing: heightened factual pleading standards present enormous practical and
23 1See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
232 1d
233 Given the substantial burden imposed by such a bond, and given the rarity with which the
bond proceeding/heightened pleading standard is likely to be employed, it may be advisable to
allow interlocutory appeal of the court's decision for both parties.
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theoretical challenges.234 Given that, what exactly should the default
pleading standard be for claims presenting the requisite risk of opportunistic
filing?
No magical phrasing or standard characterization is available to short-
circuit the analysis. Fact pleading has long had different meanings in
different times and in different places, and even if we were to adopt a
specific historical incarnation of fact pleading, there would still be inherent
ambiguity in the categories and requirements. For example, many fact
pleading standards became hopelessly entangled in debates regarding the
character of factual allegations, and as Judge Clark noted, distinctions
between "law" and "fact" are rarely as clear-cut as one might hope.235
Thus, we must generate a heightened pleading standard without specific
reference to the fact pleading standards of the past.236
That said, the general idea behind heightened pleading in high-risk
scenarios is to create factual focal points around which the parties and the
court can build an efficient pretrial. The best way to accomplish this goal is
to require the plaintiff to allege specific factual occurrences at a "5Ws"-
who, what, when, where and why-level of specificity.237  Applied to
pleading, a 5Ws 238 approach would effectively require the plaintiff to do
more than simply allege wrongdoing of a certain character. Instead, the
plaintiff must include factual details that pin the wrongdoing to specific
2 3 4 See Clark, supra note 157, at 277.
235 See generally id.
236There is one potentially worthwhile distinction in the fact pleading regime: that between
"evidentiary facts" and "ultimate facts." Though still susceptible to confusing interpretation and
implementation, the distinction does capture the general gist of the problem. "Evidentiary facts"
concerned the particular events of the case, e.g., "the defendant was driving west on Elm Street."
By contrast, "ultimate facts" alleged the substance of a cause of action, e.g., "the defendant
negligently struck plaintiff with his vehicle." Fact pleading required the pleading of ultimate facts
rather than evidentiary. This gets things exactly backward. From an economic perspective, in
cases of cost disparity plaintiffs should be required to plead evidentiary facts, not ultimate facts.
Thus, one approach to the pleading problem would essentially turn fact pleading around; it would
not be enough to allege that "defendants conspired in violation of the antitrust laws," but it might
be enough to allege a series of evidentiary facts that if proven, tend to support that conclusion.
237See, e.g., L.N. FLINT, NEWSPAPER WRITING IN HIGH SCHOOLS 47 (1917). From a
pleading perspective, the less catchy "4Ws and an H" might be more appropriate; "why" is not
typically relevant to the pleading process, but "how" often is.
238 There are several additional formulations of this maxim, in addition to scholarly criticisms
of its application to news-writing. For an example of the latter, see Philip F. Griffin, The
Correlation of English and Journalism, 38 ENG. J. 189, 192-93 (1949).
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dates, people and locations. Each of these factual allegations can then
become a focal point for judicial management and limited pretrial inquiry;
if that limited inquiry fails to produce summary judgment evidence, then
the case can and should be dismissed at an early stage.
Consider a slightly streamlined version of the facts in Twombly. Under
the most liberal view of notice pleading, an antitrust plaintiff might survive
a motion to dismiss by alleging nothing more than, for example, a specific
commercial practice of the defendant's was the result of a conspiracy
among competitors. Pretrial inquiry regarding such an open-ended claim is
likely to be similarly open-ended, with no realistic way for the judge to
streamline discovery in a meaningful manner. By comparison, a 5Ws
default standard would require the plaintiff to allege some details of the
conspiracy: Where did it happen? Who was involved? When did the
conspirators meet? What did they agree upon?
Despite their prolixity, the plaintiffs' pleadings in Twombly arguably did
not satisfy a 5Ws standard. 239 Although the plaintiffs did offer substantial
detail of the "what"--an alleged conspiracy among incumbent
telecommunications providers not to compete with one another and to
discriminate against non-incumbent competitors-they failed to allege any
meaningful facts regarding the "who," the "where", or the "when" of the
alleged conspiracy.240
What, then, would have satisfied a 5Ws requirement? The Supreme
Court's announced standard in Twombly is too strict to be applied
universally, and its apparent "quick look" to the merits is not an appropriate
justification for the standard.241 But the Court's choice of terminology in
that case, plausibility, is helpful. A 5Ws pleading is one that contains
enough factual detail to be plausible.
Thus, the addition of just a few additional factual allegations might have
sustained the Twombly plaintiffs' claim. For example, if the complaint had
alleged that the defendants initiated their conspiracy at a meeting at the
Honolulu Hilton on June 23, 2003, that factual detail might have made the
239 See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
24°Id
24 1 Id. The point of a heightened pleading standard should be to reduce the in terrorem value
of lawsuits, not by insisting that the pleadings demonstrate some objective indicia of merit, but by
requiring pleadings that can be tested at relatively low cost when a notice pleading standard would
generate disproportionately high costs for defendants.
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claim plausible in a way that saved the pleading.242 So too, if the complaint
alleged that the defendants' commercial practices regularly changed in
concert after, for example, regularly scheduled trade association meetings.
Importantly, the point here is not to require the plaintiff to plead facts that
suggest substantive merit, but rather to require facts around which a court
can construct a more efficient, lower-cost pretrial.243 If the Twombly
plaintiffs had alleged a Honolulu meeting among various defendant
executives, then the proof or disproof of that meeting would have been a
logical focal point (and limiting factor) for discovery. If the plaintiffs had
alleged a pattern of commercial practice changes after trade association
meetings, the court could instead focus pretrial inquiry on those meetings.
The scientific literature offers a relatively close analogy: the heightened
standard should require plaintiffs to plead easily "testable hypotheses"
whose truth or falsity ultimately point to the existence or nonexistence of
the underlying legal wrong.244 In the social science literature, open-ended
research questions are disfavored relative to testable hypotheses. Thus,
"Are children more resilient than we think they are?" or even "Children are
more resilient than we think they are" are too vague to be subject to
rigorous social science research. By contrast, a genuinely testable
hypothesis might look something like the following statement: "Children's
scores on the Resilience Scale will negatively correlate with their parents'
scores on the Perceptions of Child Resilience Scale.,
245
Though the analogy is imperfect, the distinction between notice
pleading and strict pleading is similar. Under notice pleading, a claim that
"defendant engaged in an antitrust conspiracy to fix prices" would be
242 Perhaps "plausibility" is actually the wrong word; a pleading might still satisfy the 5Ws
requirement (and thus be entitled to limited, focused discovery) if it alleged a conspiracy among
telecom executives that took place on a tramp steamer bound from Havana to Miami with
contraband Cuban cigars. The point is that the pleading provides a focal point for inquiry.
243 There is some unavoidable overlap; however, courts will understandably be less concerned
about letting cases move forward if the plaintiff has satisfied a heightened pleading standard. This
is partially attributable to a likely decrease in pretrial costs, but it is also at least partially
attributable to some increased likelihood of substantive merit. The point is that the Supreme
Court's focus on "plausibility" is misplaced to the extent it is a proxy for an increased likelihood
of defendant's ultimate liability.
244See generally Norman A. Desbiens, The Presence of Hypotheses in the Scientific
Literature, 6 J. PHIL. SCI. & L. 50 (2006), available at
http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/jpsl/archives/all/scientific hypotheses.html.
245 See, e.g., Statistics Consulting Blog, http://statconsultant.blogspot.com/2008/0 I/stating-
testable-hypotheses.html (Jan. 5, 2008, 11:55 EST).
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sufficient to provide the requisite notice with few additional details. But to
the extent discovery is analogous to scientific research, this is a remarkably
vague and open question, and would not be an appropriate working
hypothesis. By comparison, "defendants met to fix prices at the Honolulu
Hilton on June 23, 2003" (1) can be proved or disproved with relative ease
and certainty, and (2) points toward the existence or nonexistence of the
underlying legal wrong. This is a relevant testable hypothesis. Again, the
issue is not whether the pleading itself increases the likely merit of the
plaintiffs claim, but rather whether it presents an easily (and cheaply)
falsifiable hypothesis that impacts the substance of plaintiff s claim.
Thus, an assertion like, "On June 25, 2003, defendant ABC Corp.
announced a price increase," would not be sufficient to qualify as a relevant
testable hypothesis, because even if proved, it does little or nothing to
advance the ball as to the underlying legal wrong: whether the defendants'
pricing practices were the function of an intercompany agreement. By
contrast, a pleading that details a pattern of trade association meetings
followed by price increases would likely satisfy the standard.
Generic allegations of conspiracy or fraud, without more, are not readily
susceptible to focused inquiry in the same way. In a world of liberal notice
pleading, there is effectively no foundation around which a court can
construct a more limited pretrial inquiry. Moreover, in the absence of the
salience created by a bond hearing, judges will have little incentive to so
limit discovery, even assuming it would be possible. By requiring that, in
order to avoid a bond, the plaintiff must plead plausible "newspaper facts"
or relevant testable hypotheses, the court will substantially reduce the costs
associated with pretrial, thus reshaping the parties' ex ante cost expectations
in a way that substantially mitigates the risk of opportunistic pleading.
It is important to note that the vast majority of litigated cases already
satisfy the heightened standard. Breach of contract claims, personal injury
tort claims, and most other forms of traditional civil litigation necessarily
involve the pleading of a plausible factual nexus; they include details
regarding the date of the accident, the identities of the contracting parties,
the circumstances of the allegedly wrongful termination, etc. For the most
litigated civil claims, the flow chart ends with the court's determination that
the pleading satisfies even the heightened standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
The tension inherent in the selection of pleading standards makes it
difficult to draw firm lines. Informational asymmetry and other advantages
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favoring defendants certainly justify a liberal approach to case initiation.
But there are countervailing concerns. In particular, when substantial
pretrial cost disparities favor the plaintiff, she may file suit without regard
for the suit's substantive merit, because defendants face an economic
incentive to settle such suits rather than pursue them to disposition.
The economics of pleading thus suggest that the general preference for
liberal pleading standards can sometimes go too far. To the extent notice
pleading standards contribute to cost disparity by broadening the scope of
pretrial inquiry and increasing defendant's pretrial costs, application of a
stricter pleading standard may be appropriate when the cost disparity is
sufficiently great. By requiring the plaintiff bringing a high-risk claim to
satisfy a heightened pleading standard, the court can limit defendant's
pretrial costs and thus reduce the cost disparities that can sometimes induce
plaintiffs to file frivolous claims.
Any increase in Type II error occasioned by the adoption of bifurcated
pleading standards can be addressed by inclusion of a bond requirement.
Plaintiffs unable to satisfy the heightened pleading standard could
nonetheless proceed through discovery on a notice pleading standard by
posting a bond that would be forfeit to defendant if the plaintiff's claim is
dismissed at summary judgment or before.
Though this solution does not wholly eliminate cost arbitrage risks, it
represents a substantial improvement over both traditional notice pleading
and the apparently universal heightened standard announced by the
Supreme Court in Twombly. This Article's approach helps to break the
Type I/Type II error deadlock and brings the law closer to the Supreme
Court's enduring vision of pleading's important role in U.S. civil
procedure: "to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."
246
246See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957).
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Appendix
This Appendix offers a slightly more formal version of the game
theoretic model presented in prose form in Part IV of the text. As noted in
Part IV, the model makes several standard assumptions (e.g., party
rationality) and provides a single-period analysis. Because the model also
assumes perfect and symmetrical information, the model is fully determined
and initial actions can be predicted by backward induction.
THE BASIC GAME THEORETIC MODEL
The model focuses primarily upon the plaintiffs decision to file a
lawsuit, reasoning backward from the defendant's likely actions in response
to that filing. Let Hp equal the plaintiffs expected internal pretrial costs, let
It equal plaintiffs expected trial/disposition costs, let y equal the
probability of a plaintiff's verdict at trial, and let x equal the amount of the
verdict such that yx equals the consensus expected "merits" value of the
claim. In the simplest case, the plaintiff will file suit if
YX > ip + Fit
That is, plaintiff will file suit if she rationally expects to recover more
than her full litigation costs at trial.
But given the peculiarities of U.S. civil litigation, the defendant's
expected payoffs at various junctures may be sufficient in themselves to
encourage the plaintiff to file, regardless of the merits of plaintiffs claim.
Assume, therefore, that y equals 0, such that the expected value of
plaintiffs claim yx is also zero.247 Let S equal the proposed settlement
amount, and let A. equal the defendant's expected internal pretrial litigation
costs. Further let A, equal the defendant's expected internal trial or
disposition costs, and let ej, equal the defendant's expected external costs
of settlement. If the plaintiff pursues her claim to disposition, the
defendant's payoff will be
-yx[O] - Ap- At
And if the plaintiff drops her claim after defendant refuses to settle,
defendant's payoff will be
-A 
r
247 Additional variations on this model might integrate positive expected value suits.
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because the Rules allow for the full imposition of pretrial costs once the
pleading stage is passed. By contrast, if the defendant settles the claim
before incurring pretrial costs, its payoff will be
-S - eAs
Thus, viewed in a vacuum, the defendant has an incentive to settle any
claim, regardless of the value of yx, for any amount S such that
S < Ap - eAs
The plaintiff in turn has an incentive to file her lawsuit if her expected
pretrial costs 1Ip are less than defendant's settlement indifference value, or:
lip < Ap- es
In that case, the defendant's threat to either pursue the litigation to
disposition is not credible, because: (1) plaintiffs right to impose costs Ap
upon defendant regardless of the merits of the claim ultimately makes
disposition less attractive than settlement, once the external costs of
settlement to the defendant are factored in; and (2) defendant cannot
eliminate the full net value of a settlement by imposing reciprocal costs
upon the plaintiff.
When these conditions hold, the model predicts a settlement equal to the
difference between plaintiffs expected costs of suit and the defendant's
indifference value:
S = ( Ap- eds) - ip
To see why this is so, consider a hypothetical settlement negotiation
between plaintiff and defendant in which plaintiff initially seeks to obtain
the full value of the defendant's settlement/disposition surplus, making an
offer S such that
S = Ap- eAs
In that case, the defendant will respond by imposing pretrial costs upon
the plaintiff up to lip. But the defendant's cost imposition strategy will not
result in tit-for-tat response by the plaintiff. Every dollar in pretrial costs
plaintiff actually imposes upon defendant reduces the defendant's
willingness to settle by the same amount. If the defendant has spent $1 in
pretrial costs, he need only spend (Ap - 1) to obtain dismissal (remember,
the expected value of plaintiffs claim is assumed to be zero), and thus his
new indifference value is (Ap -1) - eA5. Seeing this, the plaintiff will quickly
recognize that although it remains economically preferable for the
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defendant to settle rather than litigate, the defendant can nonetheless
unilaterally impose pretrial costs on the plaintiff if he so desires (thus
reducing the plaintiff's net settlement proceeds to the difference between
plaintiffs expected internal pretrial costs and defendant's indifference
value):
S =A - eAS) - rIp
Thus, all else equal, a pleading standard that reduces or eliminates the
difference between the plaintiffs internal trial costs and the defendant's
indifference value concomitantly reduces the risk of opportunistic pleading
of frivolous claims. As discussed in Part V, a fact pleading standard for
high-risk claim types will often accomplish this goal.
FACT PLEADING BOND
In the event that a plaintiff bases her rational belief in the positive merits
value of her claim upon only probabilistic evidence (e.g., general
information about population compliance), it may be desirable to allow her
claim to move forward upon the posting of a bond B that eliminates the
risks of opportunistic pleading by balancing the parties' expected payoffs.
This bond would be forfeited in its entirety to the defendant in the event of
a summary disposition in defendant's favor, and thus the relevant payoffs
would change. For the defendant facing a known frivolous claim, his
payoff at disposition would be
-Ap + B
Plaintiff's payoff at that juncture would be
-ip - B
To balance ex ante incentives, the bond would have to be set where the
defendant becomes indifferent between pursuing the case to disposition and
settlement at plaintiffs rational offer. In other words, the bond B equals
plaintiffs equilibrium settlement offer S, which equals ( Ap - ed,) - ip. For
any B greater than or equal to the difference between defendant's
indifference settlement amount and plaintiffs pretrial costs, the plaintiffs
expected net proceeds of a frivolous claim are zero or negative, because the
bond combined with the defendant's ability to impose costs without
retribution will make settlement, on net, a neutral or losing economic
proposition. For simplicity's sake, I do not model bond-hearing costs
[Vol. 6 1:1
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explicitly; they are likely to be extremely similar for both plaintiff and
defendant in any given case, and would thus fall out of the equation.
